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ABSTRACT
STEALTHY PARAMETRIC HARDWARE TROJANS IN
VLSI CIRCUITS
SEPTEMBER 2019
SAMANEH GHANDALI
B.Sc., SHAHED UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
PhD, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christof Paar
Over the last decade, hardware Trojans have gained increasing attention in
academia, industry and by government agencies. In order to design reliable counter-
measures, it is crucial to understand how hardware Trojans can be built in practice.
This is an area that has received relatively scant treatment in the literature. In this
thesis, we examine how particularly stealthy parametric Trojans can be introduced to
VLSI circuits. Parametric Trojans do not require any additional logic and are purely
based on subtle manipulations on the sub-transistor level to modify the parameters of
few transistors which makes them very hard to detect.
We introduce a design methodology to insert stealthy parametric hardware Trojans
which are based on injecting extremely rare path delay faults into the netlist of the
target circuit. As a case study, we apply our method to a 32-bit multiplier circuit
resulting in a stealthy Trojan multiplier that computes faulty outputs for specific
combinations of input pairs that are applied to the circuit. The multiplier can be
v
used to realize bug attacks, introduced by Biham et al. in 2008. We also extend this
concept and show how it can be used to attack ECDH key agreement protocols. Our
method is a versatile tool for designing stealthy Trojans for a given circuit and is not
restricted to multipliers and the bug attack.
In this thesis we also examine how a stealthy side-channel hardware Trojan can be
inserted in a provably-secure side-channel analysis protected implementation. Once
the Trojan is triggered, the malicious design exhibits exploitable side-channel leakage
leading to successful key recovery attacks. The underlying concept is based on a
secure masked hardware implementation which does not exhibit any detectable leakage.
However, by running the device at a particular clock frequency one of the requirements
of the underlying masking scheme is not fulfilled anymore, and the device’s side-channel
leakage can be exploited. We apply our technique to a Threshold Implementation
of the PRESENT block cipher realized in both FPGA and ASIC. We show that
triggering the Trojan makes both FPGA and ASIC prototypes vulnerable to certain
SCA attacks.
True random number generators (TRNGs) are an essential component of cryp-
tographic designs, which are used to generate private keys for encryption and au-
thentication, and are used in masking countermeasures. This thesis also presents a
mechanism to design a stealthy parametric hardware Trojan for ring oscillator-based
TRNGs. When the Trojan is triggered by operation at a specific high temperature
the malicious TRNG generates predictable non-random outputs, yet under normal
operating conditions it works correctly. Also we elaborate a stochastic model based
on Markov Chains by which the attacker can use their knowledge of the Trojan to
predict the TRNG outputs.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
MOTIVATION
1.1 Introduction
Cryptographic primitives are often the most trusted components in modern security
solutions, ranging from network routers to IoT devices. Unfortunately, this makes
cryptographic algorithms an attractive target for subversion by malicious actors.
Manipulating hardware implementations as opposed to software implementations can
lead to cryptographic Trojans that are particularly difficult to detect. It is widely
believed that such Trojans are of special interest to nation-state adversaries. Hardware
Trojans are malicious alterations of the physical design that compromise the security
or safety of the attacked device. They have gained increasing attention in academia,
industry and government agencies over the last ten years or so. There is a large body of
research concerned with various methods for detecting Trojans, cf., e.g., [42, 87, 24, 9].
On the other hand, there is scant treatment in literature about how to design Trojans.
Nevertheless, Trojan detection and design are closely related: in order to design
effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures, we need an understanding of
how Hardware Trojans can be built. This holds in particular with respect to Trojans
that are specifically designed to avoid detection. The situation is akin to the interplay
of cryptography and cryptanalysis.
There are several different ways that hardware Trojans can be inserted into an
IC [42]. The insertion scenarios that have drawn the most attention in the past are
hardware Trojans introduced during manufacturing by an untrusted semiconductor
foundry. One of the main motivations behind this is the fact that the vast majority
of ICs world wide are fabricated abroad, and a foundry can possibly be pressured by
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a government agency to maliciously manipulate the design. However, we note that
a similar situation can exist in which the original IC designer is pressured by her
own government to manipulate all or some of the ICs, e.g., those that are used in
overseas products. Similarly, 3rd party IP cores are another possible insertion point.
The possibility of hardware Trojan insertion is not restricted to the manufacturing in
foreign countries. Government mandated backdoors or malicious employees could also
be the source of Hardware Trojans. All of these insertion scenarios have in common
that the party inserting the Trojan will have a main goal of designing/implementing
the Trojan in such a way that the chance of detection becomes very low.
The primary setting we consider in this dissertation is modification during manu-
facturing, but the methods also carry over to the other scenarios mentioned above.
The Trojan will be inserted by modifying a few gates at the sub-transistor level during
manufacturing. This contribution is concerned with cryptographic Trojans which
possess zero overhead in terms of logic resources and are thus, extremely stealthy.
The dissertation introduces three different techniques related to hardware Trojans
including i) a design methodology for inserting a stealthy parametric hardware Trojan,
ii) a side-channel hardware Trojan for provably-secure SCA protected implementations,
iii) a temperature-based hardware Trojan for ring oscillator-based TRNGs.
In our design methodology for inserting hardware Trojans, the goal is to select an
extremely rare path and chose the delays of its gates such that only for extremely
rare input combinations these delays add up to a path delay fault. Since not a single
transistor is removed or added to the design and the changes to the individual gates
are minor, the Trojan is very difficult to detect post-manufacturing using reverse-
engineering, visual inspection, side-channel profiling or most other known detection
methods. Due to the extremely rare trigger conditions, it is also highly unlikely that
the Trojan will be detected during functional testing. Even full reverse-engineering of
the IC will not reveal the presence of the backdoor. Similarly, since the actual Trojan
will be inserted in the last step of the design flow, the Trojan will not be present at
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higher abstraction levels such as the netlist. Accordingly, this type of Trojan is also
very interesting for the scenario of stealthy, government-mandated backdoors. The
number of engineers that are aware of the Trojan would be reduced to a minimum
since even the designers of the Trojan-infected IP core would not be aware that such a
backdoor has been inserted into the product. This can be crucial to eliminate the risk
of whistle blowers revealing the backdoor. In summary, our methodology overcomes
two major problems a Trojan designer faces, namely making the Trojan detection
resistant and to provide a very rare trigger condition.
Besides the hardware Trojan design methodology, this dissertation focuses on
an aspect of hardware security that is one of the major research areas in hardware
security: side-channel analysis. In a side-channel analysis an attacker exploits the
fact that an embedded device is not a black-box that obtains defined inputs and only
produces defined outputs. Instead, every physical system that performs some kind of
computation will inevitably leak additional information over physical channels, such
as the power consumption, the required execution time, or the thermal profile. In
side-channel analysis, these physical properties are first measured and then exploited
to derive additional information about the embedded system. Such information could
be the secret key that is used in an encryption algorithm. We present a mechanism
which shows how stealthy side-channel hardware Trojans can be inserted in provably-
secure side-channel analysis protected implementations. Once the Trojan is triggered,
the malicious design exhibits exploitable side-channel leakage leading to successful
key recovery attacks. Integrating an SCA Trojan into an SCA-protected design is
challenging if the device is supposed to be evaluated by a third-party certification
body. To pass certification, the the device should provide the desired SCA protection
under a white-box scenario, i.e., all design details including the netlist are known to
the evaluation lab. We present a mechanism to design a provably- and practically-
secure SCA-protected implementation which can be turned into an unprotected
implementation by a Trojan adversary. In ASIC platforms, it is indeed inserted by
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subtle manipulations at the sub-transistor level to modify the parameters of a few
transistors. The same is achievable on FPGA applications by changing the routing
of particular signals, without other resource utilization overhead. The underlying
concept is based on a secure masked hardware implementation which does not exhibit
any detectable leakage. However, by running the device at a particular clock frequency
one of the requirements of the underlying masking scheme is not fulfilled anymore,
i.e., the Trojan is triggered, and the device’s side-channel leakage can be exploited.
High entropy random numbers are an essential component in many facets of
information security, which forms the foundation for many cryptographic algorithms
used to build cryptosystems. Some common applications are generating private keys,
nonces, random numbers in challenge response protocols, and random numbers in
countermeasure implementations to mask key-dependent values. One of the most
popular methods for generating random numbers is sampling jittery signals generated
by ring oscillators (ROs) [86] and [25]. In this dissertation, we present a parametric
hardware Trojan for an RO-based TRNG presented in [86] in such a way that it works
correctly under normal environmental conditions, but it produces non-random and
predictable outputs at particular environmental conditions such as high environmental
temperature. Our Trojan does not require the addition of any additional logic (even a
single gate) to the design, making it extremely hard to detect. More precisely, our
technique injects a parametric Trojan that can be triggered. Under normal conditions
the randomness of the TRNG output is not affected, which enables the Trojan to avoid
being detected by an evaluation lab. By increasing the temperature of the subverted
device (or by increasing its workload) the Trojan is triggered and exhibits non-random
and periodic outputs. We show that by injecting this Trojan, we are able to control
the output of the TRNG. This biasing significantly lowers the security level even of
highly protected crypto-core implementations rely on the TRNG. Also we elaborate a
stochastic model based on Markov Chains by which the attacker’s knowledge enables
predicting the output of the Trojan infected TRNG.
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1.2 Organization and Contribution of the Thesis
The main contributions in this thesis are as follows:
• The thesis introduces a new class of parametric hardware Trojans, the Path
Delay Trojans. They possess the two desirable features that they are (i) very
stealthy and thus difficult to detect with most standard methods and (ii) have
very rare trigger conditions. We present an automation flow for inserting the
proposed style of Trojan. We propose an efficient, SAT solver-based path
selection algorithm, which identifies suitably rare paths in a given target circuit.
We also propose a second algorithm, based on genetic algorithms, for distributing
the necessary delay along the rare path to minimize its impact on the remaining
circuit. As a case study for the effectiveness of the proposed method, a Trojan
multiplier is designed. We were able to identify a rare path and perform specific
delay modification in a 32-bit multiplier circuit model in such a way that the
faulty behavior only occurs for very few combinations of two consecutive input
values. We note that the input space of the multiplier is (232)2 = 264 so that
random input values occur very rarely during regular operation. We show how
the Trojan multiplier can used for realizing the bug attack by Biham et al.
[10, 11] and propose a related attack on the ECDH key agreement protocol. We
show that the attacker can engineer the failure probability to the desired level
by increasing the introduced propagation delay of the Trojan.
• The thesis presents a mechanism to design a provably- and practically-secure
SCA-protected implementation which can be turned into an unprotected im-
plementation by a Trojan adversary. Our Trojan does not add any logic (even
a single gate) to the design, making it very hard to detect. In case of ASIC
platforms, the trojan is added by slightly changing the characteristic of a few
transistors, and for FPGA platforms by changing the routing of particular sig-
nals. Most notably, our technique is not based on the leakage of the PRNG,
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and it does not affect the provable-security feature of the underlying design
unless the Trojan is triggered. Under normal conditions the device does not
exhibit any SCA leakage. By increasing the clock frequency of the malicious
device (or by decreasing its supply voltage) the Trojan is triggered and exhibits
exploitable leakage. The high clock frequency that triggers the Trojan is beyond
the maximum frequency at which the device can correctly operate. Hence, the
device is not expected to be evaluated under such a condition by evaluation labs.
• The thesis proposes parametric hardware Trojans for RO-based TRNGs. We
target the TRNG presented in [86] so that it works correctly under normal
environmental conditions, but produces predictable outputs at a particular high
temperature. Our parametric Trojan does not require the addition of any logic
to the design, making it extremely hard to detect. We show that by injecting
this Trojan, we are able to controllably bias the output of the TRNG, and we
elaborate a stochastic Markov Chain model by which the attacker’s knowledge
of the Trojan enables predicting the outputs of the Trojan infected TRNG.
This biasing can compromise the security of any functionality that relies on the
TRNG.
The chapters of the thesis are structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with necessary
background and definitions in the areas of hardware Trojans and threshold implemen-
tations as an SCA countermeasure, and reviews related work in these areas. Chapter 3
introduces our methodology to design stealthy parametric hardware Trojans that
induce path delay faults (PDF) for extremely rare inputs. The chapter presents path
selection and delay distribution algorithms, applies them to a 32-bit multiplier circuit,
and shows how to exploit the specific fault model of the path delay Trojan multiplier
to attack ECDH key agreement protocols. Chapter 4 shows how to insert a parametric
hardware Trojan with very low overhead into SCA-resistant designs on ASIC and
FPGA platforms to leak exploitable information through side channels. Chapter 5
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explain how we insert a stealthy parametric hardware Trojan into the RO-based
TRNG circuit which will be triggered by a specific high operating temperature, and
we elaborate a stochastic model based on Markov Chains by which the attacker can
predicted the output of the Trojan infected TRNG. The findings in this thesis are
summarized in Chapter 6 and possible future work is discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Hardware Trojans
The power of hardware Trojans was first demonstrated by King et al. in 2008 by
showing how a hardware Trojan inserted into a CPU can enable virtually unlimited
access to the CPU by an external attacker [46]. The Trojan presented by King et
el. was inserted into the HDL code of the design. Similarly, Lin et el. presented
a hardware Trojan that stealthily leaks out the cryptographic key using a power
side-channel [51]. This hardware Trojan was also inserted at the HDL or netlist level,
similarly to the hardware Trojans that were designed as part of a student hardware
Trojan challenge at ICCD 2011 [71]. How to build stealthy Trojans at the layout-level
was demonstrated in 2013 by Becker et el. which showed how a hardware Trojan
can be inserted into a cryptographically secure PRNG or a side-channel resistant
S-Box only by manipulating the dopant polarity of a few registers [7]. Another idea
proposed in literature is building hardware Trojans that are triggered by aging [79].
Such Trojans are inactive after manufacturing and only become active after the IC
has been in operation for a long time. Kumar et el. proposed a parametric Trojan [50]
that triggers probabilistically with a probability that increases under reduced supply
voltage.
Compared to research concerned with the design of hardware Trojan, considerably
more results exist related to different hardware Trojan detection mechanisms and
countermeasures. Most research focuses on detecting hardware Trojans inserted during
manufacturing. In many cases, a Trojan-free golden model serves as a reference. One
important question is how to get to a Trojan-free golden model. One approach
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proposed is to use visual reverse-engineering of a few chips to ensure that these chips
were not manipulated. For this the layout is compared to SEM images of the chip.
In [4] methods of how to automatically do this are discussed. Please note that that
not all hardware Trojans are directly visible in black-and-white SEM images. For
example, to detect the dopant-level hardware Trojans additional steps are needed,
e.g., the method presented by Sugawara et el. [80]. One motivation of our work is
that we might achieve an even higher degree of stealthiness by only slowing down
transistors as opposed to completely changing transistors as has been done in [7].
Such parametric changes can be done cleverly to make visual reverse-engineering
very difficult as discussed in Section 3.2. Another approach to Trojan detection uses
power profiles that are used to compare the chip-under-test with previously recorded
side-channel measurement of the golden chip. The most popular approach uses power
side channels, first proposed by Agrawal et el. [3]. The idea to build specific Trojan
detection circuitry has also been proposed, e.g., in [72]. However, these approaches
usually suffer from the problem that a Trojan can also be inserted into such detection
circuitry. Preventing hardware Trojans inserted at the HDL level by third party IP
cores has been discussed, e.g., in [41] and [84]. Efficient generation of test patterns for
hardware Trojans triggered by rare input signals is the focus of work by Chakraborty
et el. [24] and Saha et el. [74]. [45] and [44] focus on preventing a reverse engineer
from learning the exact function implemented on a target chip.
Closely related to hardware Trojans are certain types of physical attacks. A
physical attack on random number generators was presented in [58] which targets
an RO based TRNG implemented in an IC. Injecting a sine wave onto the power
supply, the operating conditions were modified and a bias appeared at the output
signal. Another physical attack presented in [6], targets another RO based TRNG [85]
using an electromagnetic attack. In this attack, the ROs were locked on the injection
frequency, generating a controllable bias at the output. The work in [59] investigated
9
the impact of power and clock glitches, temperature and underpowering on a TRNG
design [25] implemented on an FPGA.
2.2 Side-Channel Based Trojans
Our focus in this subsection is Trojans which leak out secrets through a side
channel. The first such Trojan has been introduced in [52] and [53] which stealthily
leaks out the cryptographic key through a power consumption side channel. This
Trojan, made by a moderately large circuit including an LFSR and leaking circuit,
is inserted at the HDL or netlist level. Therefore, it is likely detected by a Trojan
inspector. Further, the Trojan designs in these works [52, 53] are not triggerable, i.e.,
they always leak through the side channel, which might be exploited by anybody not
only the Trojan attacker.
On the other hand, the cryptographic devices— if pervasive and/or ubiquitous— are
in danger of side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. Two decades after the introduction of
such physical attacks [47, 48], integration of dedicated SCA countermeasures is a must
for devices which deal with security. Therefore, if the design is not protected against
SCA threats, any SCA adversary would be able to reveal the secrets independent of
the existence of such a Trojan [53].
In a follow-up work [43], the authors expressed a relatively similar concept on
an SCA-protected implementation. Their technique is based on inserting a logical
circuit forming an LFSR-based Trojan leaking the internal state of a PRNG. As a
side note, random number generators are necessary modules for those SCA-protected
implementations which are based on masking [56]. Hence, the Trojan adversary would
detect the internal state of the PRNG by means of SCA leakages and can then be able
to conduct DPA attacks due to knowing the masks. It should be noted that those
products which need to be protected against physical attacks are usually evaluated
by a third-party certification body, e.g., through a common criteria evaluation lab.
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Therefore, due to its relatively large circuit, such a Trojan is very likely detected by
an inspector.
As another work in this domain, we should refer to [7], where the Trojan is inserted
by changing the dopant polarity of a few transistors in a circuit realized by the
DPA-resistant logic style iMDPL [67]. However, no such logic styles can perfectly
provide security, and the leakage of an iMDPL circuit can still be exploited by ordinary
SCA adversaries [60].
2.3 Threshold Implementation
It can be said that masking is one of the most-studied countermeasures against
SCA attacks. Masking is based on the concept of secret sharing, where a secret x
(e.g., intermediate values of a cipher execution) is represented by a number of shares
(x1, . . . ,xn). In case of an (n, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, having access to
t < n does not reveal any information about x. Amongst those is Boolean secret
sharing, known as Boolean masking in the context of SCA, where x =
n⊕
i=1
xi. Hence,
if the entire computation of a cipher is conducted on such a shared representation, its
SCA leakage will be (on average) independent of the secrets as long as no function
(e.g., combinatorial circuit) operates on all n shares.
Due to the underlying Boolean construction, application of a linear function L(.)
over the shares is straightforward since L(x) =
n⊕
i=1
L(xi). All the difficulties belong to
implementing non-linear functions over such a shared representation. This concept
has been applied in hardware implementation of AES (mainly with n = 2) with no
success [66, 57, 22, 61] until the Threshold Implementation (TI) – based on sound
mathematical foundations – has been introduced in [65], which defines minimum
number of shares n ≥ t+ 1 with t the algebraic degree of the underlying non-linear
function. For simplicity (and as our case study is based on) we focus on quadratic
Boolean functions, i.e., t = 2, and minimum number of shares n = 3. For example for
cubic bijection functions, decomposition techniques can be used to obtain quadratic
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bijection functions [17, 30, 31]. Suppose that the TI of the non-linear function y = F(x)
is desired, i.e., (y1,y2,y3) = F∗(x1,x2,x3), where
y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ y3 = F(x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3). (2.1)
Indeed, each output share yi∈{1,2,3} is provided by a component function F i(., .)
which receives only two input shares. In other words, one input share is definitely
missing in every component function. This, which is a requirement defined by TI
as non-completeness, supports the aforementioned concept that “no function (e.g.,
combinatorial circuit) operates on all n shares”, and implies the given formula n ≥ t+1.
Therefore, three component functions (F1 (x2,x3) ,F2 (x3,x1) ,F3 (x1,x2)) form the
shared output (y1,y2,y3).
2.3.1 Uniformity
In order to fulfill the above-given statement that “having access to t < n shares does
not reveal any information about x”, the shares need to follow a uniform distribution.
For simplicity suppose that n = 2, and the shares (x1,x2) represent secret x. If
the distribution of x1 has a bias (i.e., not uniform) which is known to the adversary,
he can observe the distribution of x2 = x ⊕ x1 and guess x. Hence, the security
of masking schemes1 relies on the uniformity of the masks. More precisely, when
x1 = m, x2 = x⊕m, and m is taken from a randomness source (e.g., a PRNG), the
distribution of m should be uniform (with full entropy).
The same holds for higher-order masking, i.e., n > 2. However, not only the
distribution of every share but also the joint distribution of every t < n shares is
important. In case of F∗(., ., .) as a TI of a bijective function F(.), the uniformity
property of TI is fulfilled if F∗(., ., .) forms a bijection. Otherwise, the security of
such an implementation cannot be guaranteed. Note that fulfilling the uniformity
1Except those which are based on low-entropy masking [23, 55].
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property of TI constructions is amongst its most difficult challenges, and it has been
the core topic of several articles [17, 68, 14, 65, 8]. Alternatively, the shares can be
remasked at the end of every non-uniform shared non-linear function (see [14, 62]),
which requires a source to provide fresh randomness at every clock cycle. Along the
same line, another type of masking in hardware (which reduces the number of shares)
has been developed in [73, 36], which (almost always) needs fresh randomness to fulfill
the uniformity.
We should emphasize that the above given expressions illustrate only the first-order
TI of bijective quadratic functions. For other cases including higher-order TI we refer
the interested reader to the original articles [65, 14, 17].
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CHAPTER 3
A DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR STEALTHY
PARAMETRIC HARDWARE TROJANS
1In this work, we examine how particularly stealthy Trojans can be introduced to
a given target circuit. The Trojans are triggered by violating the delays of very rare
combinational logic paths. These are parametric Trojans, i.e., they do not require any
additional logic and are purely based on subtle manipulations on the sub-transistor
level to modify the parameters of the transistors. The Trojan insertion is based on
a two-phase approach. In the first phase, a SAT-based algorithm identifies rarely
sensitized paths in a combinational circuit. In the second phase, a genetic algorithm
smartly distributes delays for each gate to minimize the number of faults caused by
random vectors.
As a case study, we apply our method to a 32-bit multiplier circuit resulting in a
stealthy Trojan multiplier. This Trojan multiplier only computes faulty outputs if
specific combinations of input pairs are applied to the circuit. The multiplier can be
used to realize bug attacks, introduced by Biham et al. [10, 11]. In addition to the
bug attacks proposed previously, we extend this concept for the specific fault model
of the path delay Trojan multiplier and show how it can be used to attack ECDH key
agreement protocols.
1The research presented in this chapter was published in [32].
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3.1 Overview
This work implements Trojan functionality in a given target circuit by using path
delay faults (PDF), without modification to logic circuit, to induce inaccurate results
for extremely rare inputs. Before describing the details of our method, we first define
the notion of a viable delay-based Trojan in the unmodified HDL of the circuit as
follows. A viable delay-based trojan must posses the following two properties.
Triggerability For secret inputs, which are known to the attacker, cause an error
with certainty or relatively high probability.
Stealthiness For randomly chosen inputs, cause an error with extremely low proba-
bility.
As shown in Fig. 3.1, our method of creating triggerable and stealthy delay-based
Trojans consists of two phases: path selection and delay distribution. We give an
overview of each phase here, and give detailed descriptions in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the proposed method for creating a stealthy PDF (path delay
faults).
Path Selection: The path selection phase finds a rarely sensitized path from the
primary inputs of a combinational circuit to the primary outputs. The algorithm
chooses the path incrementally by adding gates to extend a subpath backward toward
inputs and forward toward outputs. The selection of which gates to include is guided
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by controllability and observability metrics so that the path will be rarely sensitized.
To ensure that the selected path can be triggered, a SAT-based check is performed to
ensure that the path remains sensitizable each time a gate is added. In addition to
ensuring that the path is sensitizable, the SAT-based check also provides the Trojan
designer with a specific input combination that will sensitize the path. This input
combination will later serve as the trigger for the Trojan. Details of the path selection
are given in Sec. 3.3.
Delay Distribution: After a rarely sensitized path is selected, the overall delay of
the path must be increased so that a delay fault will occur when the path is sensitized;
this is required for the Trojan to be triggerable. However, any delay added to gates on
the selected path may also cause delay faults on intersecting paths, which would cause
more frequent errors and compromise stealthiness. Our delay distribution heuristic
addresses this problem by smartly choosing delays for each gate to minimize the
number of faults caused by random vectors. At the same time, the approach ensures
that the overall path delay is sufficient for the fault to occur when the trigger vectors
are applied. Details of delay distribution are given in Sec 3.4.
3.2 Delay Insertion
Delay faults occur when the total propagation delay along a sensitized circuit path
exceeds the clock period. Our algorithm causes delay faults by increasing the delay of
gates on a chosen path. While the approach is compatible with any mechanism for
controlling gate delays, in this section we provide background on practical methods
that a Trojan designer might use to implement slow gates. In static CMOS logic, a
path delay fault is not triggered by a single input vector, but instead is triggered by
a sequence of two input vectors applied on consecutive cycles. The physical reason
for delay being caused by a pair of inputs is that delay depends on the charging or
discharging of capacitances, and the initial states of these capacitances in the second
vector are determined as final states from the first vector. Assuming the capacitances
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need to be charged or discharged along a path, as is the case in delay faults, the
delay of each gate depends on how quickly it can charge or discharge some amount
of capacitance on its output node, and diminishing the ability of a gate to do so will
slow it down. There are several stealthy ways of changing a circuit to make gates
slower. As an example, we list three methods below. We note that circuit designers
typically face the opposite and considerably more difficult task, namely making gates
fast. The ever-shrinking feature size of modern ICs is amenable to our goal of slowing
gates down through minuscule alterations.
3.2.1 Decrease Width
A gate library typically includes several drive strengths for each gate type, corre-
sponding to different transistor widths. A narrow transistor is slower to charge a load
capacitance because transistor current is linear in channel width. A straightforward
way to increase delay is to replace a gate with a weaker variant of the same gate, or
to create a custom cell variant with an extremely narrow channel. A limitation to
using a downsized gate is that an attacker who delayers the chip could potentially
observe the sizing optically, depending on how much the geometry has been altered.
3.2.2 Raise Threshold
A second way of increasing gate delay is to increase threshold voltages of selected
transistors through doping or body biasing. Dual-Vt design is common in ICs and
allows transistors to be designated as high or low threshold devices; low threshold
devices are fast and used where delay is critical, and high threshold devices are slow
and used elsewhere to reduce static power. Typically no more than two threshold
levels are used on a single chip because creating multiple thresholds through doping
requires additional process steps, but in principle an arbitrary number of thresholds
can be created. Body biasing, changing the body-source voltage of MOSFETs, is
another way to change threshold and delay [49]; specifically, a reverse body bias (i.e.,
body terminal at lower voltage than source) raises threshold voltage and slows down
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a device. Regardless whether the mechanism is doping or body biasing, a raised
threshold voltage will cause transistors to turn on later when an input switches, and
to conduct less current when turned on, so the output capacitance connected to
the transistor will be charged or discharged more slowly. Both, changing to dopant
concentrations and body biasing, are difficult to detect, even with invasive methods.
3.2.3 Increase Gate Length
Delay of chosen gates can be increased by gate length biasing. Lengthening the
gate of transistor causes a reduction in current, and therefore increases delay [39].
Again, the likelihood of detection depends on the degree of the alteration.
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Figure 3.2: Propagating an input transition to an output transition requires current to
charge or discharge a capacitor. Decreasing width or increasing length of MOSFETs
are two ways of reducing switching current and increasing propagation delay.
We note that the methods sketched above (and other slow-down alterations) can
be combined such that each manipulation is relatively minor and, thus, more difficult
to detect.
3.3 Phase I: Rare Path Selection
Fundamentally, the challenge in designing and validating triggerable and stealthy
delay-based Trojans is that timing and logical sensitization cannot be decoupled.
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Regardless of the type of path sensitization considered, the probability of causing an
error is not a well-defined concept until after delays are assigned. Therefore, when
designing a candidate Trojan, path selection and delay assignment must both be
considered. We will use a heuristic for this which combines logical path selection and
delay distribution along a chosen path.
In this phase we try to select a path among huge number of paths existing in
the netlist of a multiplier circuit, in such a way that random inputs will very rarely
sensitize the path. The rareness is a first step towards ensuring stealthiness of the
Trojan.
3.3.1 Controllability and Observability
Before giving our algorithm, we introduce several preliminaries. First, we note
that every node in the circuit has a controllability metric and an observability metric
associated with the 0 value and the 1 value. Controllability and observability are
common metrics used in testing. Controllability of a 0 or 1 value on a circuit node is
an estimate of the probability that a random input vector would induce that value on
that node. Observability of a 0 or 1 value on a node is an estimate of the probability
with which that value would propagate to some output signal when a random vector is
applied. For rareness, we seek a path that includes low controllability nodes and low
observability nodes, as this would indicate that the values on the path rarely occur
randomly, and when they do occur they are usually masked from reaching the outputs.
We estimate controllability using random simulation, and observability using random
fault injection [40].
3.3.2 Timing Graph
The propagation delays of logic paths in combinational VLSI circuits are typically
represented using weighted DAGs called timing graphs. Each node in a circuit will
have two nodes in the timing graph, representing rising and falling transitions on the
node; we use the terms transition and node interchangeably when discussing timing
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Figure 3.3: Circuit and corresponding timing graph.
graphs. A directed edge between two nodes exists if the transition at the tail of the
edge can logically propagate to the one at the head. The edges that exist in the timing
graph therefore depend on the logic function of each gate in the circuit (see Fig. 3.3).
For example, an AND gate with inputs A and B, and output X, will have an edge
from A ↑ to X ↑, from A ↓ to X ↓, from B ↑ to X ↑, and from B ↓ to X ↓, but will
not have an edge from A ↑ to X ↓ because a rising transition on an AND gate input
cannot induce a falling output. In timing analysis, e.g. STA, the edge weights of a
timing graph represent propagation delay, but for our purpose of path selection, the
delays are ignored and we utilize only the connectivity of the timing graph.
3.3.3 Selecting a Path Through Timing Graph
Our path selection technique seeks to find a path pi through the timing graph of
the circuit that is rarely sensitized. Note that the delays are not considered in this
phase of the work. Path pi is initialized to contain a single hard to sensitize transition
somewhere in the middle of the circuit. More formally, the starting point for the path
search is a rising or falling transition on a single node such that the product of its 0
and 1 controllability values is the lowest among all nodes in the circuit. This initial
single-node path pi is then extended incrementally backward until reaching the primary
inputs (PIs), and extended incrementally forward until reaching the primary outputs
(POs). The backward propagation is given in Alg. 1, and the forward propagation is
given in Alg. 2.
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First we explain the backward propagation heuristic in Alg. 1. Starting from the
first transition (i.e. the tail) on the current path pi, we repeatedly try to extend the
path back toward the PIs by prepending one new transition to the path. To select
such a transition, the algorithm creates a list of candidate transitions that can be be
prepended to the path. In the timing graph, these candidates are predecessor nodes
to the current tail of pi. The list of candidate nodes is then sorted according to diffj,
the difficulty of creating the necessary conditions to justify the transition. Tab. 3.1
shows the formula used to compute diffj for each transition on each gate type. Note
that our difficulty metric is weighted to always prefer robust sensitization first, and
only resort to non-robust sensitization when there are no robustly sensitizable nodes in
the list of candidates. Whenever a node is prepended to pi to create a candidate path
pi′ (line 5) the sensitizability of pi′ is checked by calling check-sensitizability function.
In this function SAT-based techniques [26] are used to check sensitizability of a path
and to find a vector pair that justifies and propagates a transition along the path
(line 6). If the SAT solver returns SAT, then path pi′ is known to be a subpath of
a sensitizable path from PIs to POs. Because the candidates are visited in order of
preference, there is no need to check other candidates after finding a first candidate
that produces a sensitizable path. At this point, the algorithm updates pi to be pi′ and
the algorithm exits the for loop having extended the path by one node. If this newly
added tail node is not a PI, then the algorithm will again try to extend it backwards.
The forward propagation algorithm (Alg. 2) is similar to the aforementioned
backward propagation algorithm, except that it adds nodes to the head of the path
until reaching POs. At each step of the algorithm, a list of candidates is again formed.
In this case, the candidates are successors of the head of the path (line 2) instead of
predecessors of the tail, and they are ordered according to difficulty of propagation
(line 3) instead of difficulty of justification (See Tab. 3.2). Each time a new candidate
path is created by adding a candidate node to the existing path, a sat check is again
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Table 3.1: Computation of diffj for different gate types. In the case of 2-input gates,
we assume without loss of generality that input A is the on-path input and B is
the off-path input. The first two columns show the output transition, and the input
transition that we are trying to justify for this output transition. Columns 3-6 show
the values that the on-path input (A) and off-path input (B) must take in the first and
second cycles to justify the desired transition. The final column shows the formula to
compute diffj in terms of the controllability of the inputs.
output input A B
Diffj
trans. trans. v(1) v(2) v(1) v(2)
X = AND(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 1 1 C1(A) ∗ C0(A) ∗ C21 (B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 - 1 C0(A) ∗ C1(A) ∗ C1(B)
X = OR(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 - 0 C1(A) ∗ C0(A) ∗ C0(B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 0 0 C0(A) ∗ C1(A) ∗ C20 (B)
X = XOR(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 0 0 C1(A) ∗ C0(A) ∗ C20 (B)
X ↓ A ↑ 0 1 1 1 C0(A) ∗ C1(A) ∗ C21 (B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 0 0 C0(A) ∗ C1(A) ∗ C20 (B)
X ↑ A ↓ 1 0 1 1 C1(A) ∗ C0(A) ∗ C21 (B)
X = BUFF(A)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 - - 1
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 - - 1
X = INV(A)
X ↓ A ↑ 0 1 - - 1
X ↑ A ↓ 1 0 - - 1
Algorithm 1: Extend path backward to PIs while trying to maximize difficulty
of justification while ensuring that path will remain sensitizable.
Require: A sensitizable subpath pi in timing graph of circuit.
Ensure: A longer sensitizable subpath pi in timing graph that starts at a PI
1: while tail(pi) /∈ PIs do
2: candidates← (∀n|n ∈ pred(tail(pi))) {transitions that can be prepended to pi}
3: candidates.order(diffj) {Order candidates by difficulty of justification}
4: for n′ ∈ candidates do
5: pi′ ← (n′, pi) {Create a candidate path by prepending current path}
6: if check-sensitizability(pi′) = SAT then
7: pi ← pi′ {candidate accepted, update path pi with new tail}
8: Exit for loop
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
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Table 3.2: Computation of diffp for different gate types. In the case of 2-input gates,
we assume without loss of generality that input A is the on-path input and B is
the off-path input. The first two columns show the output transition, and the input
transition that we are trying to propagate for this on-path input transition. Columns
3-6 show the values that the output (X) and off-path input (B) must take in the first
and second cycles to propagate the desired transition. The final column shows the
formula to compute diffp in terms of the controllability of the off-path input and
observability of output.
output input X B
Diffp
trans. trans. v(1) v(2) v(1) v(2)
X = AND(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 1 1 OB1(X) ∗OB0(X) ∗ C21 (B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 - 1 OB0(X) ∗OB1(X) ∗ C1(B)
X = OR(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 - 0 OB1(X) ∗OB0(X) ∗ C0(B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 0 0 OB0(X) ∗OB1(X) ∗ C20 (B)
X = XOR(A,B)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 0 0 OB1(X) ∗OB0(X) ∗ C20 (B)
X ↓ A ↑ 1 0 1 1 OB1(X) ∗OB0(X) ∗ C21 (B)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 0 0 OB0(X) ∗OB1(X) ∗ C20 (B)
X ↑ A ↓ 0 1 1 1 OB0(X) ∗OB1(X) ∗ C21 (B)
X = BUFF(A)
X ↓ A ↓ 1 0 - - OB1(X) ∗OB0(X)
X ↑ A ↑ 0 1 - - OB0(X) ∗OB1(X)
X = INV(A)
X ↓ A ↑ 1 0 - - OB1(X) ∗OB0(X)
X ↑ A ↓ 0 1 - - OB0(X) ∗OB1(X)
performed to ensure that the nodes are only added to pi if it remains sensitizable
(line 6).
3.4 Phase II: Delay Distribution
Once a path is selected, we must increase the delay of the path so that the total
path delay will exceed the clock period and an error will occur when the path is
sensitized. Yet, we must be careful in choosing where to add delay on the path,
because the gates along the chosen path are also part of many other intersecting or
overlapping paths. Any delay added to the chosen path therefore may cause errors
even when the chosen path is not sensitized. To ensure stealthiness, we must minimize
the probability of this by smartly deciding where to add delays along the path.
We use a genetic algorithm to decide the delay of each gate that will cause the
Trojan to be stealthy. Genetic algorithm is an optimization technique that tries to
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Algorithm 2: Extend path forward to POs while trying to maximize difficulty
of propagation while ensuring that path will remain sensitizable.
Require: A sensitizable subpath pi in timing graph of circuit.
Ensure: A longer sensitizable subpath pi in timing graph that ends at a PO
1: while head(pi) /∈ POs do
2: candidates← (∀n|n ∈ succ(head(pi))) {transitions that can be appended to pi}
3: candidates.order(diffp) {Order candidates by difficulty of propagation}
4: for n′ ∈ candidates do
5: pi′ ← (pi, n′) {Create a candidate path by appending to current path}
6: if check-sensitizability(pi′) = SAT then
7: pi ← pi′ {candidate accepted, update path pi with new head}
8: Exit for loop
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
minimize a cost function by creating a population of random solutions, and repeatedly
selecting the best solutions in the population and combining and mutating them to
create new solutions; the quality of each solution is evaluated according to a fitness
function. We use the genetic algorithm function ga in Matlab [1], and do not utilize
any special modifications to the genetic algorithm implementation. Our interaction
with the ga function is limited to providing constraints that restrict the allowed
solution space, and a fitness function for evaluating solutions. We describe these
constraints and fitness function here.
3.4.1 Constraint on Total Path Delay
Given a chosen path pi comprising gates (p0, p1, . . . , pn) and assuming a target path
delay of D, the genetic algorithm decides the delay of each gate on the path. Our first
constraint therefore specifies that the sum of assigned delays along the path is equal
to the target path delay D. To cause an error, D must exceed the clock period, and
we later show advantages of using different values of D.
D =
n∑
i=0
di (3.1)
24
3.4.2 Constraint on Delay of Each Gate
Next we provide the genetic algorithm with a hint that helps it to discover
reasonable delays for each gate. In this step, we use d′i to represent the nominal delay
of the ith gate on chosen path pi, and si to represent the a slack metric associated with
the same gate. Each slack parameter si describes how much delay can be added to
the corresponding gate without causing the path to exceed the clock period. Because
the targeted path delay D does exceed the clock period, gate delays are allowed to
exceed their computed slack. The slack for each gate is computed as a function of
the nominal delay of the gate, data dependency, and the clock period [82] [29]. The
following equation shows the constraint on delay of gate i, where c is a constant.
d′i + si − c ≤ di ≤ d′i + si + c (3.2)
3.4.3 Fitness Function
Simply stated, the cost function that we want to minimize is the probability of
causing an error when random input vectors are applied to the circuit. Because there
is no simple closed-form expression for this, we use random simulation to evaluate
the cost of any delay assignment. When the genetic algorithm in Matlab needs to
evaluate the cost of a particular delay assignment, it does so by executing a timing
simulator. The timing simulator, in our case ModelSim, applies random vectors to the
circuit-under-evaluation and a golden copy of the circuit and compares the respective
outputs to count the number of errors that occur. These errors are caused by the
delay assignments in the circuit-under-evaluation. The cost that is returned from the
simulator is the percentage of inputs that caused an error for this delay assignment.
As the genetic algorithm proceeds through more and more generations of solutions, the
quality of the solutions improve. Matlab’s genetic algorithm implementation comes
with a stopping criterion, so we simply allow the algorithm to run until completion.
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3.5 Experimental Results
We now evaluate the effectiveness of our method of designing Trojans, using a
32× 32 Wallace tree multiplier as a test case. The circuit has a nominal critical path
of length 128, and the delay of this path is 2520 ps.
3.5.1 Evaluation of Phase I (Path Selection)
To evaluate the ability of our path selection algorithm (Sec. 3.3) to find a rare
path, we compare the stealthiness of the path selected by the algorithm against the
stealthiness of 750 randomly chosen paths. For each of these paths, we seek to find
how often an error would occur under random inputs if the path delay is increased.
We measure this by uniformly increasing the delay of each gate on the path such that
the total delay of the path is 5040 ps, which is twice the delay of the nominal critical
path. After the delay modification, 10,000 random vectors are applied and the number
of error-causing vectors is counted. The histogram of Fig. 3.4 shows the result; the
x-axis represents error rates, and the y-axis shows how many of the paths have each
error rate. The result shows that a majority of paths would cause frequent errors if
their delay is increased, and these paths are thus unsuitable for stealthy Trojans. The
rare path (RP) selected by our algorithm caused an error for only 4 of 10,000 vectors.
By comparison, the best of the random paths caused an error in 174 of 10,000 vectors.
In this experiment, the path chosen by the path selection algorithm is 43x less likely
to cause an error than the best of 750 random paths. Note that this experiment is
conservative in that the amount of additional delay added is very large, and the delay
is not smartly distributed along the path to minimize detection.
3.5.2 Evaluation of Phase II (Delay Distribution)
To evaluate the effectiveness of our delay distribution method, we apply the
proposed method (Sec. 3.4) on 10 paths from the multiplier. These 10 paths are the
rare path chosen by the path selection algorithm, and 9 paths randomly selected from
the set of all paths that caused less than 10% error rates in Fig. 3.4. For each of
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Figure 3.4: Fault simulation of rare path and 750 random paths of 32× 32 Wallace
tree multiplier.
Figure 3.5: Error probability of circuit before and after optimizing delay assignment
of rare path and 9 other paths in a 32× 32 Wallace tree multiplier.
these paths, we use the genetic algorithm to optimally allocate a total delay of 3276
ps (i.e. 1.3 times of the delay of the nominal critical path) over the path, and then
evaluate the error probability using random simulation with 5,000,000 vectors. Fig. 3.5
shows the error probability of each path before and after applying our proposed delay
distribution method. In each case, the optimization step reduces the probability of
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causing an error by at least 3.5x. For the rare path (RP), just one error in 5,000,000
vectors is caused after delay distribution. This result shows that, for a given total
path delay, optimizing the delay assignment along the path can reduce the probability
of having an error when random vectors are applied. It is important to note that this
improvement in stealthiness comes from minimizing the side effects of the added delay,
and does not impact triggerability when vectors are applied that actually sensitize the
entire chosen path.
3.5.3 Overall Evaluation
We evaluate our overall methodology comprising path selection and delay distribu-
tion on the 32× 32 Wallace Tree multiplier circuit. Instead of assuming a particular
clock frequency, here we examine whether it is possible to add delay to the chosen rare
path such that the circuit will (1) exceed the nominal critical path delay of 2520 ps
when the applied input sensitizes the rare path, and (2) always have delay of less than
2520 ps otherwise. We first distribute delay uniformly over the path, and then apply
the same total delay to the path but distribute it using the genetic algorithm (Sec. 3.4).
The results are shown in Tab. 3.3. Despite simulating 260 million random vectors, we
are unable to randomly discover any vectors in which the circuit delay exceeds 2520
ps. Yet, when applying a vector pair produced by our SAT-based sensitization check,
we observe that the chosen path delay does exceed 2520 ps. As simulating 260 million
vectors on a circuit this size already used more than 240 hours of computation on an
AMD Opteron(TM) Processor running at 2.3GHz with 8 cores and 64 GB RAM, it
will become quite expensive to check increasing numbers of vectors beyond 260 million.
This highlights a significant challenge: given a space of 2128 possible vector pairs that
might cause an error, it is very hard to estimate the probability of an error that is
sufficiently rare. If the probability of error is around or above roughly 2−26, then
random simulation will suffice to find a few errors and estimate the error probability.
If the probability of error is below roughly 2−98 it would be possible to use SAT to
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exhaustively enumerate all 230 vectors that would cause an error. Unfortunately, for
very interesting region of error probabilities between 2−26 and 2−98 there is no clear
solution for estimating the error probabilities.
When the amount of delay added to the rare path is increased, and the probability
of error grows above 2−26, the error probability can feasibly be estimated with random
simulation. In this regime, we can evaluate the tradeoff of delay and trigger probability.
For example, when the chosen path is given a total delay of 3150 ps allocated using
genetic algorithm for delay distribution, and the circuit is operated at a clock period
of 2800 ps (as might be reasonable for a nominal critical path of 2520 ps) an erroneous
output occurs with probability of roughly 2−24 (once every 16 million multiplications)
when random inputs are applied. The overall tradeoff is shown in Fig. 3.6 for different
clock periods. One can exploit this tradeoff to create a desired error probability by
increasing or decreasing the total amount of delay added to the chosen path.
Table 3.3: Probability of exceeding the nominal critical path delay in a 32×32 Wallace
Tree Multiplier after adding delay to the rare path. When uniformly distributing
the delay over the path, the longest delay exceeds 2520 ps for 57 of 200,000 random
applied vectors. After using genetic algorithm (Sec. 3.4) to distribute the delay, the
circuit delay never exceeds 2520 ps in 260 million random vectors.
Delay Distribution
Uniform GA
num. of times exceeding 2520 ps 57 0
num. of random vectors applied 200,000 260M
prob. of exceeding 2520 ps 0.0003 < 2−26
3.6 Bug Attack On ECDH with a Trojan Multiplier
The main motivation of choosing a multiplier as our case study is the bug attack
paper by Biham et el. [10, 11]. They showed how several public key implementations
can be attacked if the used multiplier computes a faulty response for some rare inputs.
The real-world implications of bug attacks were first demonstrated by Brumley et el.
in 2012 when they showed how a software bug in an implementation of the reduction
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Figure 3.6: Increasing the rare path delay increases the probability of causing an error
when random vectors are applied. This delay is allocated to gates according to the
delay distribution algorithm. The results are shown for different clock periods.
step of an elliptic curve group operation in OpenSSL could be exploited to recover
private ECDH-TLS server keys [21]. Note that while they exploited a software bug as
opposed to a hardware bug and a modular reduction as opposed to a multiplication,
the attack idea itself is the same as in the original bug attack paper [10].
3.6.1 Fault Model of the Trojan Multiplier
The Trojan Multiplier introduced in the precious Section has a different fault
model than the one assumed in [10]. In particular, the output of the Trojan Multiplier
does not only depend on the current input but also on the previous inputs, i.e., it
has a state. We define the multiplication of two 32-bit numbers a1, b1 with our
Trojan Multiplier as y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) where a0, b0 is the previous input pair to
the multiplier. The list F of quadruples (a0, b0, a1, b1) are all input sequences for which
the Trojan Multiplier computes a faulty response:
For all (a0, b0, a1, b1) ∈ F : y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) 6= y = a1 · b1
For all (a0, b0, a1, b1) /∈ F : y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) = y = a1 · b1
(3.3)
Outputs computed with the Trojan Multiplier are always represented with a tilde. An
ECC scalar multiplication of point Q ∈ E with an integer k is denoted as R = k ·Q.
An elliptic curve scalar multiplication using the Trojan Multiplier is denoted with an
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, i.e., R˜ = k Q. In the following we assume that an attacker has knowledge of the
Trojan Multiplier or access to a chip with the Trojan Multiplier such that the attacker
knows for which inputs R˜ 6= R.
The attack complexity strongly depends on the probability that a multiplication
results in a faulty response. In order to be able to compute this probability we make
following definitions:
1. PM(a1,b1): Probability that for two random 32-bit integers a1, b1 there exits at
least one pair of 32-bit integers a0, b0 such that y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) computes
a faulty response
2. PM(a1): Probability that for a random 32-bit integers a1 there exits at least one
triplet of 32-bit integers a0, b0, b1 such that y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) computes a
faulty response. Probability PM(b1) is defined in the same fashion.
3. PM(a0,b0|a1,b1): Probability that for two random 32-bit integers a0, b0 and two given
integers a1, b1 the multiplication y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) computes a faulty response
if there exists at least one other input pair a′0, b
′
0 for which y˜ = MULa′0,b′0(a1, b1)
computes a faulty response
4. PM(a0|a1,b1=b0): Probability that for a random 32-bit integers a0, and two given
integers a1, b1 the multiplication y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) with b0 = b1 computes
a faulty response if there exists at least one other input pair a′0, b
′
0 for which
y˜ = MULa′0,b′0(a1, b1) computes a faulty response
Furthermore, we make following assumptions regarding these probabilities for the
Trojan Multiplier :
1. PM(a1) ≈ PM(b1) and PM(a1,b1) = PM(a1) · PM(b1)
2. PM(a0,b0|a1,b1) ≈ 0.09
3. PM(a0|a1,b1=b0) ≈ 0.18
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Assumption (1) follows from the fact that both inputs have the same impact on
the propagation path of the signal. Hence it is reasonable that both values are
equally important to determine if a multiplication fails. Assumption (2) is based on
experimental results in which 892 out of 10,000 multiplication failed when a0 and
b0 are changed randomly while keeping a1,b1 constant. Assumption (3) is based on
a similar experiment in which 1813 out of 10,000 multiplication failed when a0 was
changed randomly and b0 was fixed to b0 = b1 and a1 was kept constant as well.
3.6.2 Case Study: An ECDH implementation with Montgomery Ladder
For our case study we assume a 255-bit ECDH key agreement with a static public
key. Furthermore, we assume the implementation uses the Montgomery Ladder scalar
multiplication. The ECDH key agreement works as follows: Given are a standardized
public curve E (e.g. Curve25519) and the point G ∈ E. The private key of the
server is a 255 bit integer ks and the corresponding public key is Qs = ks · G. The
key agreement is started by the client by choosing a random 255-bit integer kc and
computing Qc = kc ·G. The client sends Qc to the server and computes the shared key
R = ks ·Qs. The server computes the shared secret key R using Qc and his secret key
ks by computing R = kS ·Qc. Usually, the key agreement is followed by a handshake
to ensure that both the client and the server are now in possession of the same shared
session key R.
The general idea of the bug attack is that the attacker makes a key guess of the
first l bits of the secret key Ks. Then the attacker searches for a point Q = m ·G such
that the scalar multiplication R˜ = ks Q results in a failure if, and only if, the most
significant bits of ks are indeed the l bits the attacker guessed. The attacker then
sends Q to the server and completes the ECDH key exchange protocol by making
a handshake with the shared key R = m ·Qs. If this handshake fails, the expected
multiplication error in the Trojan Multiplier has occurred and hence, the attacker
knows that his key guess is correct. This way more and more bits of the key are
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recovered consecutively. In the Montgomery Ladder scalar multiplication only one bit
of the key is processed in each ladder step and the attack works as follows:
1. Input: Elliptic curve E with point G ∈ E and public server key Qs ∈ E
2. Initialization: Set k = 1(2)
3. Repeat for key bit 2 to 255:
(a) Define k0 = k||0(2) [Append a zero to the key k]
(b) Define k1 = k||1(2) [Append a one to the key k]
(c) Repeatedly choose a value m and compute Q = m ·G until:
(P˜i = ki Q) 6= (Pi = ki ·Q) for i ∈ {0, 1}
(P˜j = kj Q) = (Pj = kj ·Q) for j 6= i, j ∈ {0, 1}
(d) Send Q to the server and complete handshake with R = m ·Qs
(e) If handshake failed, set k = ki, else set k = kj
The attack described above is a straight forward adaption of the bug attack from [21].
However, in the Trojan multiplier scenario the attack can be improved significantly by
adding a precomputation step. The main idea is to not use randomly generated points
Q in step 3.c) but to use points Q in which the x-coordinate Qx contains a b1 for
which the Trojan Multiplier y˜ = MULa0,b0(a1, b1) has a high chance to return a faulty
response. That is, b1 is one of the inputs for which the Trojan Multiplier fails. In each
step of the Montgomery Ladder algorithm, which is described in subsection 3.6.3, the
projective coordinate Z2 is computed with Z2 ← Z2 · Qx, hence, Qx, and therefore
also b1, is used in every ladder step. Furthermore, the value Z2 is different depending
on the currently processed key bit. Our improved attack targets this 255-bit integer
multiplication Z2 ·Qx to find a Q such that (P˜i 6= Pi) while (P˜j 6= Pj) as needed in
step 3.c) of the attack algorithm.
Unfortunately, the attacker cannot freely choose Q since the attacker needs to know
m such that Q = m ·G to finish the handshake. Instead of computing suitable points
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for each attack, we propose to search for t suitable points Q during a precomputation
step as described below:
1. Input: Elliptic curve E with point G ∈ E
2. Initialization: m = 1, Q = G
3. Repeat t times:
(a) m = m+ 1, Q = Q+G
(b) If Qx contains b1, store m and Q in list L
To compute the probability that the 255-bit integer multiplication Z2 · Qx fails
the used multiplication algorithm is important. We assume that the schoolbook
multiplication is used. One 255-bit schoolbook multiplication consists of 64 multipli-
cations of which 8 have b1 as an operand. Since one of these multiplication is a 31-bit
multiplication and we assume that only 32-bit multiplications can trigger the Trojan,
7 32-bit multiplications with b1 that can trigger the Trojan are performed in each
ladder step. Furthermore, due to the FOR loops in the schoolbook multiplication,
in 6 of these 7 multiplications b0 = b1, i.e., the second operand in the multiplication
remains unchanged. Note that PM(a0|a1,b1=b0) ≈ 0.18 and hence this is actually not
a problem but rather helpful. The average number AQ of points Q that need to be
tested until a failure occurs for key bit 1 or 0 is therefore:
AQ =
1
2
· 1
PM(a1) · PM(a0|a1,b1=b0) · 6 + PM(a1) · PM(a0,b0|a1,b1) · 1
Let us assume that the attacker tries to find a point Q for key bit i. Since the
attacker searches for a fault in the last Montgomery Ladder step, for every point
Q the attacker needs to compute i − 2 Montgomery Ladder steps (for the first key
bit no step is needed) and then two Montgomery Ladder steps for key bit 1 and 0
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respectively to check if the multiplication fails. Hence, in total the attacker needs an
average of AM Montgomery Ladder steps to recover a 255 bit key:
AM =
255∑
i=2
(i · AQ) = 255
2 + 255
2
· AQ ≈ 216 · AQ
To compute t points Q during the precomputation such that b1 is in Qx the attacker
needs in average AP = t · 1PM(b1) point additions. We chose t = 16 ·AQ which results in
a failure probability of ca. 3.3 · 10−8 which should be small enough for all reasonable
attack scenarios. Table 3.4 summarizes the attack complexity for our improved bug
attack with precomputation for different parameters for the Trojan Multiplier. To put
these numbers into perspective, the hardware implementation of curve25519 presented
in [75] can compute roughly 239.3 Montgomery Ladder steps per second on a Xilinx
Zynq 7020 FPGA. Hence, especially for a failure probability of PM(a1,b1) = 2
−48 the
attack complexity of 239 Montgomery ladder steps (and 250 point additions that only
need to be done once) is quite practical in a real-world scenario. On the other hand,
the probability that the Trojan is triggered unintentionally during normal operation
is about 2−37 which is low enough to not cause problems (see subsection 3.6.3.1 for
details).
Table 3.4: Attack complexity of the proposed improved Bug Attack using the Trojan
Multiplier assuming a 256 bit curve.
PM(a1,b1) 2
−64 2−48 2−32
Precomputation complexity (point additions) 266.8 250.8 234.8
Storage Requirement 14 PB 55 TB 215 GB
Attack complexity (scalar multiplications) 230.8 222.8 214.8
Attack complexity (Montgomery Ladder Steps) 246.8 238.8 230.8
3.6.3 Montgomery Ladder
To be able to compute the exact attack complexity the details of the Montgomery
Ladder are important to determine how many manipulations are performed in each
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step. Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 describe the details of the assumed Montgomery
Ladder implementation.
Algorithm 3: Montgomery Ladder
Input: A 255-bit scalar s and the x-coordinate Qx of Q ∈ E
Output: c-coordinate Px of point P ∈ E with P = s ·Q
1 X1 ← 1; Z1 ← 0; X3 ← Qx ; Z2 ← 1
2 for i← 254 downto 0 do
3 b← bit i of s
4 c← bit i− 1 of s for i < 254 else c← 0
5 if b⊕ c = 1 then
6 Swap(X1, X2)
7 Swap(Z1, Z2)
8 (X1, Z1, X2, Z2)← LADDERSTEP (Qx, X1, Z1, X2, Z2)
9 Px ← X1/Z1
10 return Px
Algorithm 4: LADDERSTEP of the Montgomery Ladder (for curve
25519)
Input: Qx, X1, Z1, X2, Z2
Output: X1, Z1, X2, Z2
1 T1 ← X2 + Z2
2 X1 ← X2 − Z2
3 Z2 ← X1 + Z1
4 X1 ← X1 − Z1
5 T1 ← T1 · Z2
6 X2 ← X2 · Z2
7 Z2 ← Z2 · Z2
8 X1 ← X1 ·X1
9 T2 ← Z2 −X1
10 Z1 ← T2 · a24
11 Z1 ← Z1 +X1
12 Z1 ← T2 · Z1
13 X1 ← Z2 ·X1
14 Z2 ← T1 −X2
15 Z2 ← Z2 · Z2
16 Z2 ← Z2 ·Qx
17 X2 ← T1 +X2
18 X2 ← X2 ·X2
19 return X1, Z1, X2, Z2
3.6.3.1 Computing the failure probability of a scalar multiplication
In this subsection we describe how the failure probability of a Montgomery Ladder
scalar multiplication with schoolbook multiplication on the Trojan Multiplier can be
compute. To compute the probability that the computation fails we fist compute
the probability that a computation does not fail. As noted previously, in a 255-
bit schoolbook integer multiplications with 32-bit word size, 64 multiplications are
performed. From this 64 multiplications, 49 multiplications are the multiplications
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of two 32-bit numbers, while 6 are 32-bit times 31-bit multiplications and one 31-bit
times 31-bit multiplications. We again assume that only 32-bit multiplications can
result in a faulty response. In 42 multiplications the second operand is the same as in
the previous multiplications and hence the probability that such a multiplication fails
is:
PM(a1,ab) · PM(a0|a1,b1=b0)
For 7 multiplications the failure probability is:
PM(a1,ab) · PM(a0,b1|a1,b1)
The probability that no failure occurs during one Montgomery Ladder step is therefore:
(1− PM(a1,ab))42 · (1− PM(a0,b1|a1,b1))7
A 255-bit scalar multiplication requires 254 Montgomery Ladder steps. Hence the
probability that a failure occurs is given by:
1− ((1− PM(a1,ab))42 · (1− PM(a0,b1|a1,b1))7)254
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CHAPTER 4
SIDE-CHANNEL HARDWARE TROJAN FOR
PROVABLY-SECURE SCA PROTECTED
IMPLEMENTATIONS
1In this work, we present a mechanism which shows how easily a stealthy hardware
Trojan can be inserted in a provably-secure side-channel analysis protected imple-
mentation. Once the Trojan is triggered, the malicious design exhibits exploitable
side-channel leakage leading to successful key recovery attacks. Such a Trojan does
not add or remove any logic (even a single gate) to the design which makes it very
hard to detect. In ASIC platforms, it is indeed inserted by subtle manipulations at
the sub-transistor level to modify the parameters of a few transistors. The same is
applicable on FPGA applications by changing the routing of particular signals without
any resource utilization overhead. The underlying concept is based on a secure masked
hardware implementation which does not exhibit any detectable leakage. However,
by running the device at a particular clock frequency one of the requirements of
the underlying masking scheme is not fulfilled anymore, i.e., the Trojan is triggered,
and the device’s side-channel leakage can be exploited. We apply our technique to a
threshold implementation of the PRESENT block cipher realized in FPGA platform
and two different CMOS technologies, and show that triggering the Trojan makes the
FPGA and ASICs vulnerable. Although as a case study we show an application of
our designed Trojan on the threshold implementation of the PRESENT cipher, our
methodology is a general approach and can be applied on any similar circuit.
1The research presented in this chapter was published in [27] and submitted to [33]. This research
is a joint work with Amir Moradi, Thorben Moos, and Maik Ender from Horst Gortz Institute for IT
Security, Ruhr Universit at Bochum, Germany.
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4.1 Technique
As explained in former section – by means of TI – it is possible to realize hardware
cryptographic devices secure against certain SCA attacks. Our goal is to provide a
certain situation that an SCA-secure device becomes insecure while it still operates
correctly. Such a dynamic transition from secure to insecure should be available and
known only to the Trojan attacker. To this end, we target the uniformity property of a
secure TI construction. More precisely, we plan to construct a secure and uniform TI
design which becomes non-uniform (and hence insecure) at particular environmental
conditions. In order to trigger the Trojan (or let say to provide such a particular
environmental conditions) for example we select higher clock frequency than the device
maximum operation frequency, or lower power supply than the device nominal supply
voltage. It should not be forgotten that under such conditions the underlying device
should still maintain its correct functionality.
To realize such a scenario – inspired from the stealthy parametric Trojan introduced
in Chapter 3 – we intentionally lengthen certain paths of a combinatorial circuit. This
is done in such a way that – by increasing the device clock frequency or lowering its
supply voltage – such paths become faulty earlier than the other paths. We would
achieve our goal if i) the faults cancel each others’ effect, i.e., the functionality of
the design is not altered, and ii) the design does not fulfill the uniformity property
anymore.
In order to explain our technique – for simplicity without loss of generality –
we focus on a 3-share TI construction. As explained in Section 2.3 – ignoring the
uniformity – achieving a non-complete shared function F∗(., ., .) of a given quadratic
function F(.) is straightforward. Focusing on one output bit of F(x), and representing
x by s input bits 〈xs, . . . , x1〉, we can write
Fi(〈xs, . . . , x1〉) =k0 ⊕ k1x1 ⊕ k2x2 ⊕ . . .⊕ ksxs⊕
k1,2x1x2 ⊕ k1,3x1x3 ⊕ . . .⊕ ks−1,sxs−1xs.
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The coefficients k0, . . . , ks−1,s ∈ {0, 1} form the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of the
quadratic function Fi : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}. By replacing every input bit xi by the sum of
three corresponding shares x1i ⊕ x2i ⊕ x3i , the remaining task is just to split the terms
in the ANF to three categories in such a way that each category is independent of one
share. This can be done by a method denoted by direct sharing [17] as
• F1i (., .) contains the linear terms x2i and the quadratic terms x2ix2j and x2ix3j .
• F2i (., .) contains the linear terms x3i and the quadratic terms x3ix3j and x3ix1j .
• F3i (., .) contains the linear terms x1i and the quadratic terms x1ix1j and x1ix2j .
The same is independently applied on each output bit of F(.) and all three component
functions F1 (x2,x3), F2 (x3,x1), F3 (x1,x2) are constructed that fulfill the non-
completeness, but nothing about its uniformity can be said.
There are indeed two different ways to obtain a uniform TI construction:
• If s (the underlying function size) is small, i.e., s ≤ 5, it can be found that F(.)
is affine equivalent to which s-bit class. More precisely, there is a quadratic
class Q which can represent F as A′ ◦ Q ◦ A (see [18] for an algorithm to find
A and A′ given F and Q). A classification of such classes for s = 3 and s = 4
are shown in [17] and for s = 5 in [20]. Since the number of existing quadratic
classes are restricted, it can exhaustively be searched to find their uniform TI.
Note that while for many quadratic classes the direct sharing (explained above)
can reach to a uniform TI, for some quadratic classes no uniform TI exists unless
the class is represented by a composition of two other quadratic classes [17].
Supposing that Q∗(., ., .) is a uniform TI of Q(.), applying the affine functions
A′ and A accordingly on each input and output of the component function Q∗
would give a uniform TI of F(.):
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F1(x2,x3) =A′ ◦ Q1 (A (x2) ,A (x3)) ,
F2(x3,x1) =A′ ◦ Q2 (A (x3) ,A (x1)) ,
F3(x1,x2) =A′ ◦ Q3 (A (x1) ,A (x2)) .
This scenario has been followed in several works, e.g., [63, 64, 76, 12, 16].
• Having a non-uniform TI construction, e.g., obtained by direct sharing, we
can add correction terms to the component functions in such a way that the
correctness and non-completeness properties are not altered, but the uniformity
may be achieved. For example, the linear terms x2i and/or the quadratic terms
x2ix
2
j as correction terms can be added to the same output bit of both component
functions F1 (x2,x3) and F3 (x1,x2). Addition of any correction term changes
the uniformity of the design. Hence, by repeating this process – up to examining
all possible correction terms and their combination, which is not feasible for
large functions – a uniform construction might be obtained. Such a process has
been conducted in [68, 13] to construct uniform TI of PRESENT and Keccak
non-linear functions.
We should here refer to a similar approach called remasking [62, 17] where –
instead of correction terms – fresh randomness is added to the output of the
component functions to make the outputs uniform. In this case, obviously a
certain number of fresh mask bits are required at every clock cycle (see [62, 15]).
Our technique is based on the second scheme explained above. If we make the paths
related to the correction terms the longest path, by increasing the clock frequency
such paths are the first whose delay are violated. As illustrated, each correction term
must be added to two component functions (see Figure 4.1). The paths must be very
carefully altered in such a way that the path delay of both instances of the targeted
correction term are the longest in the entire design and relatively the same. Hence, at
a particular clock frequency both instances of the correction terms are not correctly
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Figure 4.1: Exemplary TI construction with a correction term C.
calculated while all other parts of the design are fault free. This enables the design to
still work properly, i.e., it generates correct ciphertext assuming that the underlying
design realizes an encryption function. It means that the design operates like an
alternative design where no correction terms exists. Hence, the uniformity of the TI
construction is not fulfilled and SCA leakage can be exploited. To this end, we should
keep a margin between i) the path delay of the correction terms and ii) the critical
path delay of the rest of the circuit, i.e., that of the circuit without correction terms.
This margin guarantees that at a certain high clock frequency the correction terms
are canceled out but the critical path delay of the remaining circuit is not violated.
We would like to emphasize that in an implementation of a cipher once one of the
TI functions generates non-uniform output (by violating the delay of correction terms),
the uniformity is not maintained in the next TI functions and it leads to first-order
leakage in all further rounds. If the uniformity is achieved by remasking (e.g., in [37]),
the above-expressed technique can have the same effect by making the XOR with
fresh mask the longest path. Hence, violating its delay in one TI function would make
its output non-uniform, but the fresh randomness may make the further rounds of the
cipher again uniform.
Based on Figure 4.2, which shows a corresponding timing diagram, the device
status can be categorized into four states:
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Figure 4.2: Status of the design with Trojan at different clock frequencies.
• at a low clock frequency (denoted by 1 ) the device operates fault free and
maintains the uniformity,
• by increasing the clock frequency (in the 2 period), the circuit first starts to
become unstable, when indeed the correction terms do not fully cancel each
others’ effect, and the hold time and/or setup time of the registers are violated,
• by more increasing the clock frequency (in the 3 period), the delay of both
instances of the correction term are violated and the circuit operates fault free,
but does not maintain the uniformity, and
• by even more increasing the clock frequency (marked by 4 ) , the clock period
becomes smaller than the critical path delay of the rest of the circuit, and the
device does not operate correctly.
The aforementioned margin defines the length of the 2 period, which is of crucial
importance. If it is very wide, the maximum operation frequency of the resulting
circuit is obviously reduced, and the likelihood of the inserted Trojan to be detected
by an evaluator is increased.
Correct functionality of the circuit is requited to enable the device being operated
in the field. Otherwise, the faulty outputs might be detected (e.g., in a communication
protocol) and the device may stop operating and prevent collecting SCA traces.
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4.2 Application
In order to show an application of our technique, we focus on a first-order TI
design of PRESENT cipher [19] as a case study. The PRESENT S-Box is 4-bit
cubic bijection S : C56B90AD3EF84712. Hence, its first-order TI needs at least n = 4
shares. Alternatively, it can be decomposed to two quadratic bijections S : F ◦ G
enabling the minimum number of shares n = 3 at the cost of having extra register
between F∗ and G∗ (i.e., TI of F and G). As shown in [17], S is affine equivalent
to class C266 : 0123468A5BCFED97, which can be decomposed to quadratic bijections
with uniform TI. The works reported in [64, 76, 77] have followed this scenario and
represented the PRESENT S-Box as S : A′′ ◦ Q′ ◦ A′ ◦ Q ◦ A, with many possibilities
for the affine functions A′′, A′, A and the quadratic classes Q′ and Q whose uniform
TI can be obtained by direct sharing (see Section 4.1).
However, the first TI of PRESENT has been introduced in [68], where the authors
have decomposed the S-Box by G : 7E92B04D5CA1836F and F : 08B7A31C46F9ED52.
They have accordingly provided uniform TI of each of such 4-bit quadratic bijections.
We focus on this decomposition, and select G as the target where our Trojan is
implemented. Compared to all other related works, we first try to find a non-
uniform TI of G(.), and we later make it uniform by means of correction terms. We
start with the ANF of G(〈d, c, b, a〉) = 〈g3, g2, g1, g0〉:
g0 = 1⊕ a⊕ dc⊕ db⊕ cb, g2 = 1⊕ c⊕ b,
g1 = 1⊕ d⊕ b⊕ ca⊕ ba, g3 = c⊕ b⊕ a.
One possible sharing of y = G(x) can be represented by (y1,y2,y3) =
(G1 (x2,x3) ,G2 (x3,x1) ,G3 (x1,x2)) as
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y10 = 1⊕ a2 ⊕ d2c3 ⊕ d3c2 ⊕ d2b3 ⊕ d3b2 ⊕ c2b3 ⊕ c3b2 ⊕ d2c2 ⊕ d2b2 ⊕ c2b2,
y11 = 1⊕ b2 ⊕ d3 ⊕ c2a3 ⊕ c3a2 ⊕ b2a3 ⊕ b3a2 ⊕ c2a2 ⊕ b2a2,
y12 = 1⊕ c2 ⊕ b2, y13 = c2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ a2,
y20 = a
3 ⊕ d3c3 ⊕ d1c3 ⊕ d3c1 ⊕ d3b3 ⊕ d1b3 ⊕ d3b1 ⊕ c3b3 ⊕ c1b3 ⊕ c3b1,
y21 = b
3 ⊕ d1 ⊕ c1a3 ⊕ c3a1 ⊕ b1a3 ⊕ b3a1 ⊕ c3a3 ⊕ b3a3,
y22 = c
3 ⊕ b3, y23 = c3 ⊕ b3 ⊕ a3,
y30 = a
1 ⊕ d1c1 ⊕ d1c2 ⊕ d2c1 ⊕ d1b1 ⊕ d1b2 ⊕ d2b1 ⊕ c1b1 ⊕ c1b2 ⊕ c2b1,
y31 = b
1 ⊕ d2 ⊕ c1a2 ⊕ c2a1 ⊕ b1a2 ⊕ b2a1 ⊕ c1a1 ⊕ b1a1,
y32 = c
1 ⊕ b1, y33 = c1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ a1,
with xi∈{1,2,3} = 〈di, ci, bi, ai〉. This is not a uniform sharing of G(.), and by searching
through possible correction terms we found three correction terms c1b1, c2b2, and c3b3
to be added to the second bit of the above-expressed component functions, that lead
us to a uniform TI construction. More precisely, by defining
C1(x2,x3) = c2b2 ⊕ c3b3,
C2(x3,x1) = c1b1 ⊕ c3b3,
C3(x1,x2) = c1b1 ⊕ c2b2,
and adding them respectively to y11, y
2
1, and y
3
1, the resulting TI construction becomes
uniform. If any of such correction terms is omitted, the uniformity is not maintained.
In the following we focus on a single correction term c2b2 which should be added to
G1(., .) and G3(., .). A uniform sharing of F is given in the subsection4.2.1.
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4.2.1 Uniform TI of F
Considering y = F(x) and xi∈{1,2,3} = 〈di, ci, bi, ai〉 – derived by direct sharing – we
present one of its uniform sharing (y1,y2,y3) = (F1 (x2,x3) ,F2 (x3,x1) ,F3 (x1,x2))
as
y10 = b
2 ⊕ c2a2 ⊕ c2a3 ⊕ c3a2,
y11 = c
2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ d2a2 ⊕ d2a3 ⊕ d3a2,
y12 = d
2 ⊕ b2a2 ⊕ b2a3 ⊕ b3a2,
y13 = c
2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ a2 ⊕ d2a2 ⊕ d2a3 ⊕ d3a2,
y20 = b
3 ⊕ c3a3 ⊕ c1a3 ⊕ c3a1,
y21 = c
3 ⊕ b3 ⊕ d3a3 ⊕ d1a3 ⊕ d3a1,
y22 = d
3 ⊕ b3a3 ⊕ b1a3 ⊕ b3a1,
y23 = c
3 ⊕ b3 ⊕ a3 ⊕ d3a3 ⊕ d1a3 ⊕ d3a1,
y30 = b
1 ⊕ c1a1 ⊕ c1a2 ⊕ c2a1,
y31 = c
1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ d1a1 ⊕ d1a2 ⊕ d2a1,
y32 = d
1 ⊕ b1a1 ⊕ b1a2 ⊕ b2a1,
y33 = c
1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ d1a1 ⊕ d1a2 ⊕ d2a1.
4.2.2 Inserting the Trojan
We realize the Trojan functionality by path delay fault model, without modifying
the logic circuit. The Trojan is triggered by violating the delay of the combinatorial
logic paths that pass through the targeted correction terms c2b2. It is indeed a
parametric Trojan, which does not require any additional logic. The Trojan is inserted
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by modifying a few gates during manufacturing, so that their delay increase and add
up to the path delay faults.
Given in Chapter 3 , the underlying method to create a triggerable and stealthy
delay-based Trojan consists of two phases: path selection and delay distribution. In
the first phase, a set of uniquely-sensitized paths are found that passes through a
combinatorial circuit from primary inputs to the primary outputs. Controllability
and observability metrics are used to guide the selection of which gates to include
in the path to make sure that the path(s) are uniquely sensitized2. Furthermore, a
SAT-based check is performed to make sure that the path remains sensitizable each
time a gate is selected to be added to the path. After a set of uniquely-sensitized
paths is selected, the overall delay of the path(s) must be increased so that a delay
fault occurs when the path is sensitized. However, any delay added to the gates of the
selected path may also cause delay faults on intersecting paths, which would cause
undesirable errors and affect the functionality of the circuit. The delay distribution
phase addresses this problem by smartly choosing delays for each gate of the selected
path to minimize the number of faults caused by intersecting paths. At the same time,
the approach ensures that the overall path delay is sufficient for the selected paths to
make it faulty.
4.2.2.1 ASIC Platforms
In an ASIC platform, such Trojans are introduce by slightly modifications on
the sub-transistor level so that the parameters of a few transistors of the design
are changed. To increase the delays of transistors in stealthy ways, there are many
possible ways in practice. However, such Trojan is very difficult to be detected by
e.g., functional testing, visual inspection, and side-channel profiling, because not a
single transistor is removed or added to the design and the changes to the individual
2Meaning that the selected paths are the only ones in the circuit whose critical delay can be
violated.
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gates are minor. Also, full reverse-engineering of the IC would unlikely reveal the
presence of the malicious manipulation in the design. Furthermore, this Trojan would
not present at higher abstraction levels and hence cannot be detected at those levels,
because the actual Trojan is inserted at the sub-transistor level.
A path delay fault in a design is sensitized by a sequence of (at least two) consecutive
input vectors on consecutive clock cycles. Its reason is charging/discharging of output
capacitances of gates of the path. The delay of each gate is determined by its
speed in charging or discharging of its output capacitance. Therefore, if the state of
the capacitances of gates (belonging to the targeted path) is not changed (i.e., the
capacitances do not charge or discharge), the effect of the path delay fault cannot be
propagated along the path. Therefore, to trigger the path delay fault, the consecutive
input vectors should change the state of the capacitances of the targeted path.
There are several stealthy ways to change slightly the parameters of transistors
of a gate and make it slower in charging/discharging its output capacitance (load
capacitance). Exemplary, we list three methods below.
4.2.2.1.1 Decrease the Width Usually a standard cell library has different
drive strengths for each logic gate type, which correspond to various transistor widths.
Current of a transistor is linearly proportional to the transistor width, therefore a
transistor with smaller width is slower to charge its load capacitance. One way to
increase the delay of a gate is to substitute it with its weaker version in the library
which has smaller width, or to create a custom version of the gate with a narrow
width, if the lower level information of the gate is available in the library (e.g., SPICE
model). The problem here is that an inspector who test the IC optically, may detect
the gate downsizing depending on how much the geometry has been changed.
4.2.2.1.2 Raise the Threshold A common way of increasing delay of a gate is to
increase the threshold voltage of its transistors by body biasing or doping manipulation.
Using high and low threshold voltages at the same time in a design (i.e., Dual-Vt
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design ) is very common approach and provides for designer to have more options
to satisfy the speed goals of the design. Devices with low threshold voltage are fast
and used where delay is critical; devices with high threshold voltage are slow and
used where power consumption is important. Body biasing can change the threshold
voltage and hence the delay of a gate through changing the voltage between body and
source of the transistor [42]. A reverse body bias in which body is at lower voltage
than the source, increases the threshold voltage and makes the device slow. In general,
transistors with high threshold voltage will response later when an input switches,
and conduct less current. Therefore, the load capacitances of the transistors will be
charged or discharged more slowly. Dopant manipulation and body biasing, are both
very difficult to detect.
4.2.2.1.3 Increase the Gate Length Gate length biasing can increase delay of
a gate by reducing the current of its transistors [39]. The likelihood of detection of
this kind of manipulation depends on the degree of the modification.
4.2.2.2 FPGA Platforms
In case of the FPGAs, the combinatorial circuits are realized by Look-Up Tables
(LUT), in currently-available Xilinx FPGAs, by 6-to-1 or 5-to-2 LUTs and in former
generations by 4-to-1 LUTs. The delay of the LUTs cannot be changed by the end
users; alternatively we offer the following techniques to make certain paths longer.
4.2.2.2.1 Through Switch Boxes The routings in FPGA devices are made by
configuring the switch boxes. Since the switch boxes are made by active components
realizing logical switches, a signal which passes through many switch boxes has a
longer delay compared to a short signal. Therefore, given a fully placed-and-routed
design we can modify the routings by lengthening the selected signals. This is for
example feasible by means of Vivado Design Suite as a standard tool provided by
Xilinx for recent FPGA families and FPGA Editor for the older generations. It is in
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fact needs a high level of expertise, and cannot be done at HDL level. Interestingly,
the resulting circuit would not have any additional resource consumption, i.e., the
number of utilized LUTs, FFs and Slices, hence hard to detect particularly if the
utilization reports are compared.
4.2.2.2.2 Through route-thrus LUTs Alternatively, the LUTs can be config-
ured as logical buffer. This, which is called route-thrus, is a usual technique applied by
Xilinx tools to enable routing of non-straightforward routes. Inserting a route-thrus
LUT into any path, makes its delay longer. Hence, another feasible way to insert
Trojans by delay path fault is to introduce as many as required route-thrus LUTs
into the targeted path. It should be noted that the malicious design would have more
LUT utilization compared to the original design, and it may increase the chance of
being detected by a Trojan inspector. However, none of such extra LUTs realizes a
logic, and all of them are seen as route-thrus LUTs which are very often (almost in
any design) inserted by the FPGA vendor’s place-and-route tools. Compared to the
previous method, this can be done at HDL level (by hard instantiating route-thrus
LUTs).
Focusing on our target, i.e., correction term c2b2 in G1(., .) and G3(., .), by applying
the above-explained procedure, we found the situation which enables introducing delay
path fault into such routes:
• Considering Figure 4.1, the XOR gate which receives the F1 and C output should
be the last gate in the combinatorial circuit generating y11, i.e., the second bit of
G1(., .). The same holds for y31, i.e., the second bit of G3(., .).
• The only paths which should be lengthened are both instances of c2b2. Therefore,
in case of the FPGA platform we followed both above-explained methods to
lengthen such paths, i.e., between i) the output of the LUT generating c2b2 and
ii) the input of the aforementioned final XOR gate.
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We have easily applied the second method (through route-thrus LUTs) at the HDL
level by instantiating a couple of LUTs as buffer between the selected path. More
detailed results with respect to the number of required route-thrus LUTs and the
achieved frequencies to trigger the Trojan are shown in next Section 5.5.
For the first method (through switch boxes) – since our target platform is a
Spartan-6 FPGA – we made use of FPGA Editor to manually modify the selected
routes. Fig.4.3 shows two routes of a signal with different length.
We should emphasize that this approach is possible if the correction term c2b2 is
realized by a unique LUT (can be forced at HDL level by hard instantiating or placing
such a module in a deeper hierarchy). Otherwise, the logic generating c2b2 might be
merged with other logic into a LUT, which avoids having a separate path between
c2b2 and a LUT that realizes the final XOR gate.
4.3 ASIC Implementation
For ASIC platforms, we utilize the stealthy parametric Trojan introduced in
Chapter 3. It consists of two main phases: path selection phase and delay distribution
phase. We briefly explain each of these phases in Subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Our
goal is to make the paths related to our target correction term, which is added to two
component functions, the longest so that by increasing the clock frequency such paths
are the first whose delays are violated. The paths must be very carefully selected and
altered in such a way that the path delay of both instances of the targeted correction
term are the longest in the entire design and relatively the same. Hence, at a particular
clock frequency both instances of the correction terms are not correctly calculated
while all other parts of the design are fault free. This enables the design to still work
properly.
4.3.1 Rare Path Selection Phase
The path selection phase seeks to find a path pi through the netlist of the circuit
that passes through the targeted correction term. Note that the delays are not
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Figure 4.3: Two routes of the same signal in a Spartan-6 FPGA, manually perfromed
by FPGA Editor.
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considered in this phase of the work. Path pi is initialized to contain a transition on
the targeted correction term node. This initial single-node path pi is then extended
incrementally backward until reaching the primary inputs, and extended incrementally
forward until reaching the primary outputs. The path selection algorithm is given in
Alg. 5. Starting from the first transition on the current path pi, we repeatedly try to
Algorithm 5: Extracting a hard to trigger sentisizable path passing through a
specific node.
Require: A single node pi in the netlist of the circuit
Ensure: A sensitizable path pi starting at a primary input and ending at a primary output
1: while (pi does not start at a primary input) do
2: new node candidates = {All transitions that can be prepended to pi}
3: Order new node candidates by difficulty of justification.
4: for (each member n′ of new node candidates) do
5: new subpath pi′ = prepend n′ to the tail of pi
6: if (check-SAT(pi′)) then
7: pi = pi′
8: Exit for loop.
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: while (pi does not end at a primary output) do
13: new node candidates = {ALL transitions that can be appended to pi}
14: Order new node candidates by difficulty of propagation.
15: for (each member n′ of new node candidates) do
16: new subpath pi′ = append n′ to the head of pi
17: if (check-SAT(pi′)) then
18: pi = pi′
19: Exit for loop.
20: end if
21: end for
22: end while
extend the path back toward the PIs by prepending one new transition to the path.
To select such a transition, the algorithm creates a list of candidate transitions that
can be prepended to the path, which is sorted according to the difficulty of creating
the necessary conditions to justify the transition. Whenever a node is prepended to pi
to create a candidate path pi′, the sensitizability of pi′ is checked by calling check-SAT
function. In this function SAT-based techniques [26] are used to check sensitizability
of the path If the SAT solver returns SAT, then path pi′ is known to be a subpath of a
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sensitizable path from a primary input to a primary output. If this newly added tail
node is not a primary input, then the algorithm will again try to extend it backwards.
The forward propagation part is similar to the aforementioned backward propa-
gation, except that it adds nodes to the head of the path until reaching a primary
output. At each step of the algorithm, a list of candidates is again formed. In this
case, they are ordered according to difficulty of propagation instead of difficulty of
justification. Each time a new candidate path is created by adding a candidate node
to the existing path, a SAT check is again performed to ensure that the nodes are
only added to pi if it remains sensitizable.
4.3.2 Delay Distribution Phase
Once paths are selected, the delay of them must be increased so that the total
path delays exceed the clock period and errors occur when the paths are sensitized.
Choosing where to add delay on the paths must be done carefully, because the gates
along the chosen paths are also part of many other intersecting or overlapping paths.
Any delay added to the chosen paths therefore may cause errors even when the chosen
paths are not sensitized. Genetic algorithm is used to smartly decide the delay of each
gate along with some constraints to restrict the allowed solution space, and a fitness
function for evaluating solutions.
Total Path Delay Constraint: Assume each of the chosen paths pi includes n gates
and target path delay is D. This constraint specifies that the sum of assigned delays
along the path is equal to the target path delay D. To cause an error, D must exceed
the period 4 .
D =
n∑
i=0
di (4.1)
Gate Delay Constraint: Assume d′i represents the nominal delay of the i
th gate on
the chosen path pi, and si represents the slack metric associated with the same gate.
Each slack parameter si describes how much delay can be added to the corresponding
gate without causing the path to exceed the period 4 . The slack for each gate is
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computed as a function of the nominal delay of the gate, data dependency, and the
clock period [29, 82]. Because the targeted path delay D does exceed the period 4 ,
gate delays are allowed to exceed their computed slack. The following equation shows
this constraint where c is a constant.
d′i + si − c ≤ di ≤ d′i + si + c (4.2)
Fitness Function: The cost function consists two parts; i) the faults cancel each
others’ effect, i.e., the faults on targeted correction term in two functions G1 and G3
are happen at the same time and cancel the effect of each others so the functionality
of the design is not altered, and ii) the design does not fulfill the uniformity property
anymore. To cover both cases in our final cost function we define it as the following
equation in which first term corresponds to case (i) and the second term corresponds
to case (ii). Our goal is to minimize this cost function.
CostF (d1, ..., dn) = ErrorRatedesign + 1/ErrorRateG1 and G3 (4.3)
We use random simulation to evaluate the cost of any delay assignment. When
the genetic algorithm in Matlab [1] needs to evaluate the cost of a particular delay
assignment, it does so by executing a timing simulator. The timing simulator, in our
case ModelSim, applies test vectors to the circuit-under-evaluation and a golden copy
of the circuit and compares the respective outputs to count the number of errors.
4.4 FPGA Practical Results
4.4.1 Design Architecture
We made use of the above-explained malicious PRESENT TI S-Box in a design
with full encryption functionality. The underlying design is similar to the Profile 2
of [68], where only one instance of the S-Box is implemented. The nibbles are serially
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Figure 4.4: Design architecture of the PRESENT TI as the case study.
shifted through the state register as well as through the S-Box module while the
PLayer is performed in parallel in one clock cycle. Following its underlying first-order
TI, the 64-bit plaintext is provided by three shares, i.e., second-order Boolean masking,
while the 80-bit key is not shared (similar to that of [68] and [15]). Figure 4.4 shows an
overview of the design architecture, which needs 527 clock cycles for a full encryption
after the plaintext and key are serially shifted into the state (resp. key) registers.
We should here emphasize that the underlying TI construction is a first-order
masking, which can provably provide security against first-order SCA attacks. However,
higher-order attacks are expected to exploit the leakage, but they are sensitive to
noise [70] since accurately estimating higher-order statistical moments needs huge
amount of samples compared to lower-order moments. It is indeed widely known that
such masking schemes should be combined with hiding techniques (to reduce the SNR)
to practically harden (hopefully disable) the higher-order attacks. As an example we
can refer to [64], where a TI construction is implemented by a power-equalization
technique. We instead integrated a noise generator module into our target FPGA
to increase the noise and hence decrease the SNR. The details of the integrated
noise generator module is given in subsection4.4.2. Note that without such a noise
generator module, our design would be vulnerable to higher-order attacks and no
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Trojan would be required to reveal the secret. Therefore, the existence of such a
hiding countermeasure to make higher-order attacks practically hard is essential.
The design is implemented on a Spartan-6 FPGA board SAKURA-G, as a platform
for SCA evaluations [2]. In order to supply the PRESENT core with a high clock
frequency, a Digital Clock Manager (DCM) has been instantiated in the target FPGA
to multiply the incoming clock by a factor of 8. The external clock was provided by a
laboratory adjustable signal generator to enable evaluating the design under different
high clock frequencies.
Table 4.1 shows the resource utilization (excluding the noise generator) as well
as the achieved margins for the clock frequency considering i) the original design, ii)
malicious design made by through switch boxes method and iii) malicious design made
by through route-thrus LUTs technique. It is noticeable that the first malicious design
does not change the utilization figures at all since lengthening the routes are done
only through the switch boxes (see Fig.4.3). Using the second method – in order to
achieve the same frequency margins – we added 4 route-thru LUTs (at the HDL level)
to each path of the targeted correction term. This led to 8 extra LUT utilization and
4 more Slices; we would like to mention that the combinatorial circuit of the entire TI
S-Box (both G∗ F∗) would fit into 29 LUTs (excluding the route-thru ones).
Regarding the frequency ranges, shown in Table 4.1, it can be seen that the
maximum clock frequency of the malicious design is decreased from 219.2 MHz to
196 MHz, i.e., around 10% reduction. However, both 2 and 3 periods are very
narrow, that makes it hard to be detected either by a Trojan inspector or by an SCA
evaluator.
4.4.2 Noise Generator
We have built a noise generator as an independent module, i.e., it does not have
any connection to the target PRESENT design and operates independently. We
followed one the concepts introduced in [38]. As shown by Figure 4.5, it is made as
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Table 4.1: Performance figure of our PRESENT-80 encryption designs.
Design Method
Utilization
FF LUT Slice Frequency
logic route-thrus [MHz]
Original - 299 291 35 226
1
219.2
4
2 134
196219.2
212.8
Malicious switch box 299 291 35 226
Malicious route-thru LUT 299 291 43 230
a combination of a ring oscillator, an LFSR, and several shift registers. The actual
power is consumed by the shift registers. Every shift register instantiates a SRLC32E
primitive, which is a 32-bit shift register within a single LUT inside a SLICEM. The
shift registers are initialized with the consecutive values of 01. Every shift register’s
output is feedback to its input and shifted by one at every clock cycle when enabled.
Thus, every shift operation toggles the entire bits inside the registers, which maximizes
the power consumption of the shift register.
The ring oscillator, made of 31 inverter LUTs, acts as the clock source inside
the noise module for both the LFSR and the shift registers. The LFSR realizes the
irreducible polynomial x19 + x18 + x17 + x14 + 1 to generate a pseudo-random clock
enable signal for the shift registers.
We instantiated 4 × 8 instances of the shift register LUTs, fitting into 8 Slices.
The ring oscillator required 17 Slices (as stated, made of 31 inverters), and the LFSR
fits into 2 Slices, made by 1 LUT for the feedback function, 2 FFs and 2 shift register
LUTs. Overall, the entire independent noise generator module required 27 Slices.
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1010 · · · · 10
·······
en
en
Figure 4.5: Block diagram of the noise generator.
4.4.3 SCA Evaluations
4.4.3.1 Measurement Setup.
For SCA evaluations we collected power consumption traces (at the Vdd path) of
the target FPGA by means of a digital oscilloscope at sampling rate of 1GS/s. It might
be thought that when the target design runs at a high frequency > 150 MHz, such
a sampling rate does not suffice to capture all leaking information. However, power
consumption traces are already filtered due to the PCB, shunt resistor, measurement
setup, etc. Hence, higher sampling rate for such a setting does not improve the attack
efficiency3, and often the bandwidth of the oscilloscope is even manually limited for
noise reduction purposes (see [69]).
4.4.3.2 Methodology.
In order to examine the SCA resistance of our design(s) in both settings, i.e.,
whether the inserted Trojan is triggered or not, we conducted two evaluation schemes.
We first performed non-specific t-test (fixed versus random) [78, 34] to examine the
existence of detectable leakage. Later in case where the Trojan is triggered, we also
conduct key-recovery attacks.
3It is not the case for EM-based analyses.
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It should be mentioned that both of our malicious designs (see Table 4.1) operate
similarly. It means that when the Trojan is triggered, the evaluation of both designs
led to the same results. Therefore, below we exemplary show the result of the one
formed by through route-thrus LUTs.
To validate the setup, we start with a non-specific t-test when the PRNG of the
target design (used to share the plaintext for the TI PRESENT encryption) is turned
off, i.e., generating always zero instead of random numbers. To this end, we collected
100,000 traces when the design is operated at 168 MHz, i.e., the Trojan is not triggered.
We followed the concept given in [78] for the collection of traces belonging to fixed
and random inputs. The result of the t-test (up to third-order) is shown in Figure 4.6,
confirming the validity of the setup and the developed evaluation tools.
To repeat the same process when the PRNG is turned on, i.e., the masks for initial
sharing of the plaintext are uniformly distributed, we collected 100,000,000 traces
for non-specific t-test evaluations. In this case, the device still operates at 168 MHz,
i.e., the Trojan is not triggered. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 4.7.
Although the underlying design is a realization of a first-order secure TI, it can be
seen from the presented results that second- and third-order leakages are also not
detectable. As stated before, this is due to the integration of the noise generator
module which affects the detectability of higher-order leakages (see subsection4.4.2).
As the last step, the same scenario is repeated when the clock frequency is increased
to 216 MHz, where the design is in the 3 period, i.e., with correct functionality and
without uniformity. Similar to the previous experiment, we collected 100,000,000
traces for a non-specific t-test, whose results are shown in Figure 4.8. As shown by the
graphics, there is detectable leakage through all statistical moments but with lower
t-statistics compared to the case with PRNG off. Therefore, we have also examine
the feasibility of key recovery attacks. To this end, we made use of those collected
traces which are associated with random inputs, i.e., around 50,000,000 traces of
the last non-specific t-test. We conducted several different CPA and DPA attacks
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Figure 4.6: PRNG off, clock 168 MHz (Trojan not triggered), (top) a sample power
trace, t-test results (right) with 100,000 traces, (left) absolute maximum over the
number of traces.
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Figure 4.7: PRNG on, clock 168 MHz (Trojan not triggered), t-test results (right)
with 100,000,000 traces, (left) absolute maximum over the number of traces.
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considering intermediate values of the underlying PRESENT encryption function. The
most successful attack was recognized as classical DPA attacks [48] targeting a key
nibble by predicting an S-Box output bit at the first round of the encryption. As an
example, Figure 4.9 presents an exemplary corresponding result.
4.5 ASIC Practical Results
In this section we describe how we have designed and implemented first ASIC
prototypes incorporating such a malicious design. We then verify that the resulting
chips are indeed resistant against side-channel attacks when the Trojan is not triggered
and that this resistance can be nullified when triggering it.
Section 4.4 demonstrated by practical experiments that the proposed hardware
Trojan and the presented implementation techniques are valid on FPGA-based plat-
forms. Here, we aim to provide a similar case study, but with respect to ASIC
platforms. In this regard we carried out the described design stages and implemented
the trojanized PRESENT threshold implementation circuit in two different process
technologies,90 nm and 65 nm low power CMOS. Both ASICs, which can be seen in
Figure 4.10, were developed using an identical design procedure, including the usage
of low, high and standard threshold voltage cells, and were manufactured by the same
foundry.
The size of both chips is 2mm x 2mm. The side-channel resistant PRESENT TI
cores containing the parametric SCA Trojans have been placed and routed in clearly
delimited rectangular areas, which are marked in red color with a white cross in both
layout schematics 4.10a and 4.10b, taken from the Synopsys IC Compiler (Version
2016.12) software.
We made use of the malicious PRESENT TI S-Box that has been introduced in
the previous sections and embedded it in a design with full encryption functionality
shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.8: PRNG on, clock 216 MHz (Trojan triggered), (top) a sample power trace,
t-test results (right) with 100,000,000 traces, (left) absolute maximum over the number
of traces.
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Figure 4.9: PRNG on, clock 216 MHz (Trojan triggered), 50,000,000 traces, DPA
attack result targeting a key nibble based on an S-Box output bit at the first round.
(a) Layout schematic 65 nm ASIC (b) Layout schematic90 nm ASIC
(c) Photo of packaged 90 nm
ASIC
(d) Microscope photo
90 nm ASIC
Figure 4.10: Layout schematic and photos of the ASIC prototypes.
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Synthesizing the unaltered threshold implementation of the PRESENT S-Box (i.e.,
without the inserted Trojan) in the 90 nm and 65 nm target libraries revealed that the
design could potentially meet clock frequencies in the GHz range, even when operated
under worst case operating conditions (i.e., low supply voltage, high temperature).
Unfortunately, no digital IO cells were available in our target technologies that could
reliably propagate such a high-frequency clock into the circuit. Thus, when inserting
the Trojan in the proposed way, i.e., by subtle manipulations at the sub-transistor
level, and keeping period 3 small and stealthy, it could never be triggered, due to
the restrictions of the IO cells and the extremely high performance of the circuit in
the target technologies.
This observation already shows that implementing and testing such a design on an
ASIC is more challenging than on an FPGA, due to the much higher performance
of ASICs. In this regard we have to conclude that an ultra-lightweight block cipher
implementation like the serialized PRESENT, implemented in an advanced CMOS
technology with small propagation delays, may not be the optimal choice for integrating
such a Trojan on an ASIC in the most stealthy way. Yet, to keep the results comparable
to those in [27], we stick to this example and find a workaround for the IO restriction.
Another difficulty when developing ASIC prototypes is the extensive amount of
time and monetary resources that have to be invested. Thus, it is desirable to obtain
a fully functioning prototype in the first attempt when designing a test chip. However,
this is particularly difficult to achieve when the functionality of the design depends
highly on the exact timing of certain signal paths in such a way that even small
deviations from the predicted behavior can invalidate crucial assumptions. In such a
case the designer has to trust its foundry that the characterized timing information
included in the standard cell libraries and simulation models perfectly reflects the
reality – which is hardly ever possible due to process variations. Thus, even commercial
IC design houses often require multiple generations of prototypes that need to be
characterized and adapted between each iteration to finally end up with a marketable
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end-user product. Unlike FPGA platforms where a new HDL design can be synthesized
and implemented within a few minutes and without any additional cost, which allows
for trial & error approaches, an IC implementation requires at least several months
per tape out as well as a significant amount of money, even when sharing a wafer
between multiple projects. Thus, for our case study, in order to not require multiple IC
manufacturing iterations, but rather obtain a working prototype in the first attempt,
we chose to limit the potential sources of error at the cost of sacrificing a part of the
potential stealthiness of the Trojan. In particular, we chose to realize the delay which
needs to be distributed among the selected paths partially by so-called delay gates4
and optimize for a broad frequency range that triggers the Trojan while the PRESENT
core still encrypts correctly (i.e., period 3 ). A delay gate does not have any logical
functionality but simply propagates its input signal with a certain propagation delay
to its output. Clearly, inserting delay gates into the masked S-Box makes the Trojan
less stealthy than sub-transistor level modifications. The same is true for a significant
reduction of the overall operating frequency of the circuit as it can be observed in the
results presented in the following (this reduction is neccessary due to the restrictions
of the IO cells). However, we would like to stress that this case study is simply proving
the conceptual soundness of the approach, in the sense that inserting this delay-based
Trojan makes a side-channel resistant implementation vulnerable when increasing the
clock frequency beyond a certain point. It is planned to demonstrate the stealthiness
of the Trojan on ASIC platforms in further case studies. In many cases, for example
targeting more complex non-linear functions (like the AES S-Box) or less advanced
CMOS technologies (implying larger delays), such a use of additional delay gates will
not be required since the critical path of the design actually restricts the maximum
operating frequency of the design (and not the limitations of the IO cells). Again,
we chose the PRESENT threshold implementation as a case study here to keep the
4Those gates were required since selecting even the slowest cells (high threshold voltage, low drive
strength) could not add enough delay in order to make the Trojan triggerable through the IO cells.
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Table 4.2: Area comparison (post-layout) of PRESENT TI implementation with and
without inserted Trojan (realized by delay gates).
Technology node Area w/o Trojan Area w/ Trojan Overhead
65 nm 4988.5 GE 5006.5 GE +0.36%
90 nm 4807.8 GE 4825.8 GE +0.37%
Table 4.3: Frequency ranges for the different design states.
Status 65 nm ASIC 90 nm ASIC
1 f ≤ 33 MHz f ≤ 56 MHz
2 33 MHz < f ≤ 38 MHz 56 MHz < f ≤ 61 MHz
3 38 MHz < f ≤ appr. 1 GHz 61 MHz < f ≤ appr. 1 GHz
4 appr. 1 GHz < f appr. 1 GHz < f
results comparable to [27]. And even in our case, where we particularly aimed for a
broad range of period 3 , the overhead in terms of area is very small, even less than
half a percent as apparent from Table 4.2. The range of clock frequencies that cause a
certain state of the trojanized design can be seen in Table 4.3. As described before,
state 3 has the broadest frequency range and can easily be targeted by setting the
clock frequency above 38 MHz for the 65 nm ASIC and 56 MHz for the 90 nm ASIC.
The upper limit where the output of the circuit becomes faulty is an approximation,
since it could not be determined experimentally due to the limitation of the IO cells.
4.5.1 Measurement Setup
In order to perform the SCA evaluations on the ASIC prototypes we built a simple
custom measurement board. Since the ASICs have been packaged in JLCC-44 package
(see Figure 4.10c), the custom board provides a corresponding PLCC-44 socket as well
as connectors for a BASYS-3 FPGA board (containing an Artix-7 FPGA) to control
the communication between PC and the ASIC. We measured the power consumption
of the ASICs in the Vdd path by means of a digital sampling oscilloscope at a fixed
sampling rate of 200 samples per clock cycle. Since the operating frequency varies
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between the different scenarios (Trojan triggered or not triggered), fixing the number
of samples per clock cycle (instead of per time period) is the most fair evaluation
method.
4.5.2 SCA Results
We evaluate the SCA resistance of our designs in three different settings using a
non-specific t-test (fixed versus random) [34, 78] to examine the existence of detectable
leakage. First, to validate the correct functionality of the setup, we start with a
non-specific t-test when the PRNG of the target design (used to share the plaintext
for the TI PRESENT encryption) is turned off, i.e., generating always zero instead of
random numbers. Afterwards, we activate the PRNG and operate the design at low
frequency in order to not activate the Trojan. Then, when the PRNG is still running
we increase the clock frequency in order to activate the Trojan. In the latter case we
also conduct key-recovery attacks.
4.5.2.1 Results on 90 nm ASIC
We first collected 1,000,000 traces with PRNG switched off when the design is
operated at 25 MHz, i.e., the Trojan is not triggered. We followed the concept given
in [78] for the collection of traces belonging to fixed and random inputs. Figure 4.11
shows the corresponding t-test results.
As expected a significant amount of detectable leakage can be observed in all
moments, confirming the validity of the setup and the developed evaluation tools.
To repeat the same process when the PRNG is turned on, i.e., the masks for
initial sharing of the plaintext are randomly chosen and uniformly distributed, we
collected 50,000,000 traces for non-specific t-test evaluations. In this case, the device
still operates at 25 MHz, i.e., the Trojan is not triggered. The corresponding results
are shown in Figure 4.12.
It can be seen that no leakage is detected in any of the three statistical moments
after 50,000,000 traces. However, when observing the progress of the maximum
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Figure 4.11: 90 nm ASIC, PRNG off, clock frequency 25 MHz (trojan not triggered),
t-test results with 1 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number
of traces (right).
absolute t-value in the second-order moment over the number of traces one may
notice that the 4.5 threshold is occasionally exceeded. We should emphasize here that
the underlying TI construction is a first-order masking, which can provide provable
security against first-order SCA attacks. However, higher-order attacks (in this case
second-order attacks already) are expected to exploit the leakage, but they are sensitive
to the noise level [70] since accurately estimating higher-order statistical moments
requires huge amounts of samples compared to lower-order moments. Thus, the
second-order leakage is not unexpected, but the noise level seems too large to reliably
detect (or exploit) this leakage.
As the last step, the same scenario is repeated when the clock frequency is increased
to 85 MHz, where the design is in the 3 period, i.e., with correct functionality and
without uniformity. Similar to the previous experiment, we collected 50,000,000 traces
for a non-specific t-test, whose results are shown in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.12: 90 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 25 MHz (trojan not triggered),
t-test results with 50 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number
of traces (right).
As shown by the graphics, there is detectable leakage through the first and second
statistical moment but with lower t-statistics compared to the case with PRNG off.
Therefore, we also have to examine the feasibility of key recovery attacks. To this end,
we made use of those collected traces which are associated with random inputs, i.e.,
around 25,000,000 traces of the last non-specific t-test. We conducted several different
CPA and DPA attacks considering intermediate values of the underlying PRESENT
encryption function. The most successful attack was recognized as classical DPA
attack [48] targeting a key nibble by predicting an S-Box output bit at the first round
of the encryption. As an example, Figure 4.14 presents an exemplary corresponding
result.
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Figure 4.13: 90 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 85 MHz (trojan triggered), t-test
results with 50 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number of
traces (right).
4.5.2.2 Results on 65 nm ASIC
After we have seen that the Trojan indeed achieves what it has been designed for
on the 90 nm ASIC, we repeat the same kind of experiments on the 65 nm chip. At
first, the results after 1,000,000 traces with the deactivated Trojan (25 MHz) and the
switched off PRNG can be seen in Figure 4.15.
As before, detectable leakage is visible in all three statistical moments, but its
magnitude is significantly smaller than on the 90 nm ASIC, indicating a lower signal-
to-noise ratio. Thus, for the next step with PRNG on we measured more traces
than before, namely 80,000,000. The results in Figure 4.16 show that with PRNG on
and the Trojan not triggered at 25 MHz clock, there is no detectable leakage in any
moment.
When measuring at 50 MHz, however, i.e., triggering the Trojan, significant leakage
can be detected in all moments, as apparent in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.14: 90 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 85 MHz (trojan triggered), CPA
results targeting a key nibble based on an S-Box output bit with 25 million traces
(right), absolute maximum correlation coefficient over the number of traces (left).
The successful CPA in 4.18 targeting a key nibble based on an S-Box output bit
using 40,000,000 traces confirms that the leakage is indeed exploitable.
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Figure 4.15: 65 nm ASIC, PRNG off, clock frequency 25 MHz (Trojan not triggered),
t-test results with 1 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number
of traces (right).
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Figure 4.16: 65 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 25 MHz (Trojan not triggered),
t-test results with 80 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number
of traces (right).
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Figure 4.17: 65 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 50 MHz (Trojan triggered),
t-test results with 80 million traces (left), absolute maximum t-value over the number
of traces (right).
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Figure 4.18: 65 nm ASIC, PRNG on, clock frequency 50 MHz (trojan triggered), CPA
results targeting a key nibble based on an S-Box output bit with 40 million traces
(right), absolute maximum correlation coefficient over the number of traces (left).
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CHAPTER 5
TEMPERATURE-BASED HARDWARE TROJAN FOR
RING-OSCILLATOR-BASED TRNGS
True random number generators (TRNGs) are essential components of crypto-
graphic designs, which are used to generate private keys for encryption and authentica-
tion, and are used in masking countermeasures. In this work, we present a mechanism
to design a stealthy parametric hardware Trojan for a specific TRNG architecture
proposed by Yang et al. at ISSCC 2014. Once the Trojan is triggered the malicious
TRNG generates predictable non-random outputs. Such a Trojan does not require
any additional logic (even a single gate) and is purely based on subtle manipulations
on the sub-transistor level. The underlying concept is to disable the entropy source at
high temperature to trigger the Trojan, while ensuring that Trojan-infected TRNG
works correctly under normal conditions. We show how an attack can be performed
with the Trojan-infected TRNG design in which the attacker uses a stochastic Markov
Chain model to predict its reduced-entropy outputs.
5.1 Introduction
High entropy random numbers are essential components for many cryptographic
algorithms. Some applications of TRNGs are generating private keys, nonces, random
numbers in challenge response protocols, and random numbers in countermeasure
implementations to mask key-dependent values. One of the most popular method for
generating random numbers is sampling jittery signals generated by ring oscillators
(ROs) [86, 25]. In this chapter, we present a parametric hardware Trojan for an RO-
based TRNG presented in [86] so that it works correctly under normal environmental
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conditions, but produces predictable outputs at particular high temperatures. The
Trojan is introduced by slightly changing the characteristics of a few transistors. We
show that by injecting this Trojan, we are able to precisely control the output of the
TRNG. This biasing can significantly lower the security level of any cryptographic
applications that rely on the TRNG. A stochastic Markov Chain model allows the
attacker to use their knowledge of the Trojan to predict the output of the Trojan-
infected TRNG.
5.2 Ring oscillator-based TRNG
We consider the true random number generator (TRNG) design proposed in [86].
Figure 5.1 shows the TRNG architecture, which is based on the collapse time of three
racing edges in a ring oscillator (RO). The design has two ring oscillators (RO). The
first one is a reference that operates as a standard single-edge ring oscillator. The
second one, which is called 3-edge RO, has three edges injected by three input nodes
that propagate through the ring together at the same time (Figure 5.2). These edges
in the 3-edge RO have same period, but they are shifted 120◦ in phase. As a result of
this the frequency of the output of the 3-edge RO is boosted 3× in comparison to the
regular RO. There is an increasing variation of the pulse width between edges in the
3-edge RO because of thermal noise (jitter) that exists in the system. This variation
in the pulse widths causes neighboring edges to eventually collapse in the 3-edge RO,
after which there is only a single oscillation in the ring. The collapse event in turn
causes the 3-edge RO to change to a typical 1x frequency mode as can be seen in
Figure 5.3. The time to collapse is used as the entropy source for the TRNG.
Phase frequency detector (PFD) module in the TRNG architecture shown in
Figure 5.1 is used to detect the edge collapse events by comparing the frequencies of
the regular RO and the 3-edge RO. A 14-bit counter counts the number of cycles until
edge collapse event. This counter increments on rising edges of the 3-edge RO.
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Figure 5.1: TRNG system block diagram [86]
Figure 5.2: 3-edge ring oscillator
Figure 5.3: Output waveforms of the regular RO (bottom) and 3-edge RO (top)
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The number of cycles to collapse follows inverse Gaussian distribution caused
by thermal noise. In this design effect of process variation is canceled because all
three edges propagate through the same RO stages[81]. We need to extract uniformly
distributed random bits from collapse time. A simple method which has been applied
in TRNG designs [81], [54] is to take the lower bits of the collapse count as output
while the LSB is dropped to eliminate sensitivity to mismatch in the counter sampling
flip-flop. In our work we consider COUNT[6:4] as the TRNG random output bits.
5.3 Hardware Trojan RO-based TRNG
Our goal is to maliciously manipulate the TRNG design to produce predictable
outputs at a particular high environmental temperature. The conditions that cause a
transition from correct behavior to Trojanized behavior should be available and known
only to the Trojan attacker. In order to trigger the Trojan, the attacker must apply
the specific temperature which could for example be beyond the maximum operating
temperature of the device.
To realize such a scenario – inspired from the stealthy parametric Trojan introduced
in [33] – we intentionally lengthen a certain path of a combinatorial circuit. This
is done in such a way that by increasing the device’s temperature, a signal on this
path propagates slower than in normal operation. In the 3-edge RO construction, we
achieve our goal of compromising the entropy by delaying one of the three edges of the
3-edge RO, which causes the RO to collapse in a few cycles with negligible variation.
This rapid collapse behavior is not useful for generating random bits as it does not
provide enough entropy.
Our technique for causing the delay change is based on manipulating one of the
NAND gates that injects an edge to the RO circuit in such a way that its propagation
delay is increased with temperature. The NAND gate must be very carefully altered
in such a way that its propagation delay becomes more sensitive to the temperature
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variation than the other gates of the 3-edge RO. Note that the functionality of the
design is unaltered during the normal environmental temperature.
In the rest of this section, we explain how we inject the Trojan into the RO-based
TRNG by modifying parameters of a few transistors, and how we use temperature as
the trigger of our Trojan.
5.3.1 Temperature Dependence of Propagation Delay
Temperature can affect various process parameters of a device such as threshold
voltage, carrier mobility, and leakage current. In this work, we focus on manipulation
of threshold voltage and show how this can be used by an attacker to trigger the
Trojan at a specific operating temperature. The threshold voltage of a device can be
changed by various methods such as ion implantation or body biasing.
Threshold voltage and mobility decrease as the temperature increases. As supply
voltage (Vdd) scaled in new technology generation, the value of |VGS − VTH | decreases.
The smaller |VGS − VTH | makes saturation current more sensitive to change in VTH ,
which decreases when temperature increases. The larger VTH incurs less current that
makes the device slower. On the other hand, transition delay is related to the carrier
mobility, which decreases when temperature rises. Therefore, the device performance
depends on the racing condition of electron mobility and VTH when temperature rises.
Equation 5.1 shows the variation of propagation delay Dp [83].
Dp ∝ CoutVdd
I − d ≡
CoutVdd
µ(T )(Vdd − VTH(T )) (5.1)
As the carrier mobility (µ) decreases, the performance degrades, while the decrease
in threshold voltage VTH makes the device faster. Therefore, to make the propagation
delay of our target NAND gate in the 3-edge RO circuit more sensitive to the
temperature increases, we manipulate the threshold voltages of its transistors and use
a combination of high VTH and low VTH transistors for its implementation.
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5.3.2 Injecting temperature-triggered Trojan into RO-based TRNG
The time to collapse is used as the entropy source for random number generation,
and delaying the start of any edges will cause the output to be not random. We focus
on a single NAND gate B shown in Figure 5.4. We realize the Trojan functionality by
increasing the delay sensitivity of the NAND gate B to temperature increases without
modifying the logic circuit. The Trojan is triggered by increasing the delay of the
NAND gate B by increasing temperature, so that the edge B is injected to the RO
with delay. It means that the neighboring edges of the edge B can reach it sooner than
in the unmodified circuit. As a result of this, we will have a small time to collapse
and hence reduced entropy. Utilizing the temperature characteristics described in
Section 5.3.1, an attacker adjusts the threshold of individual transistors in the circuit
so that the circuit works correctly at the normal environmental temperatures, but
acts as a Trojan beyond a particular temperature.
We show in Figure 5.4 how we modify the transistor-level implementation of the
targeted NAND gate B to make it more sensitive to the temperature. We use high
threshold voltages (high-VTH) for the NMOS and PMOS transistors connected to the
start input, whose threshold voltages are increased from their standard values. As
a result of this, both modified transistors will be slow to propagate the transitions
on the start input to the output of the NAND gate when the temperature increases.
Furthermore, to these two transistors more sensitive to temperature than the other
transistors, we use low threshold voltages (low-VTH) for the rest of the transistors
in the circuit so that their delay will not increased as much as these two targeted
transistors. Note that the amount of delay added to the targeted NAND gate by the
threshold voltage manipulation is small in the regular environmental temperature
and does not affect the behavior of the 3-edge RO, so the malicious modification is
extremely difficult to detect.
As an example, we simulate the maliciously manipulated 3-edge RO design in two
different environmental temperatures; 25◦C (as a normal environmental temperature),
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Figure 5.4: Threshold voltage manipulation of the 3-edge RO
and 120◦C (as an increased environmental temperature). The Trojanized circuit
behaves similar at 25◦C to the unmodified 3-edge RO and there is a large collapse time
(Figure 5.5(a)) which can be used as a source of entropy for random number generation.
At 120◦C, the behavior of the Trojanized circuit is changed and it collapses in a few
cycles (Figure 5.5(b)). The immediate collapse occurs because the edge at NAND gate
B in the manipulated 3-edge RO is not injected into the ring simultaneously with the
two other edges injected at A and C. The immediate collapse behavior is not useful
for extracting random bits and does not provide enough entropy. This is how the
proposed temperature-triggered hardware Trojan removes the source of randomness
from the 3-edge RO when the temperature rises.
5.4 How to Predict the Output of the Trojan TRNG
In this section, we describe how, in principle, an attack on the Trojan infected ran-
dom number generator can be executed. When an attacker wants to attack the TRNG,
she may choose the environment temperature and the input master clock (MCLK)
of the TRNG at her will. But even when attacker knows the operating conditions of
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Figure 5.5: Output waveform of the Trojan infected 3-edge RO at (left) 25◦C where
there is a large time to collapse, and (right) 120◦C where there is a very small time to
collapse
the TRNG, its output bit-stream cannot be predicted perfectly, because of existing
jitter in the TRNG, which follows independent normal distribution (N(0, σ2jitter)). We
elaborate a stochastic model for the attacker’s knowledge to predict the output of
the Trojan infected TRNG with a Markov chain model to describe the probability of
occurrence for different output sequences of the Trojan infected TRNG.
5.4.1 Markov chain
A Markov chain is a stochastic model which describes a sequence of possible events
in which the probability of each event depends only on the state in the previous
event [28]. Assume we have a process with a set of states S = s1, s2, ..., sr. The process
starts in one of these states (initial state) and moves from one state to another. If the
process is in state si, then it moves to state sj with a transition probability pij at the
next step , which is independent of states the chain was in before. Here we use two
examples to explain the Markov chain concept from [35].
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Example 1 [35]: Assume we want to model with a Markov chain the weather
of a city that never has two nice days consecutively. If it has a nice day, it has snow
or rain in the next day with equal probability. If it has snow or rain, it has an even
chance of having the same the next day. If there is change from snow or rain, only
half of the time is this a change to a nice day. The city transition probability matrix
is defined as follows.
P =

1
2
1
4
1
4
1
2
0 1
2
1
4
1
4
1
2

Power Matrix: Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain. The ijth entry
p
(n)
ij of the matrix P
n gives the probability that the Markov chain, starting in state si,
will be in state sj after n steps [35].
Example 2 [35]: Consider the weather of the city explained in Example 1. We
are interested in the state of the chain after a large number of steps. Here are the
powers of the Transition Matrix P:
P 1 =

0.5 0.25 0.25
0.5 0.0 0.5
0.25 0.25 0.5

P 2 =

0.438 0.188 0.375
0.375 0.250 0.375
0.375 0.188 0.438

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P 3 =

0.406 0.203 0.391
0.406 0.188 0.406
0.391 0.203 0.406

5.4.2 Predicting Bits
As we explained in Section 5.3, our Trojan removes the entropy source of the
manipulated TRNG when temperature increases so that the Trojan infected TRNG
counts as a non-random and predictable counter when temperature rises. For example
the TRNG counter value increments by approximately 130 in each cycle when we
set the period of the MCLK to 26ns. The variation in the counts is due to jitter
which follows a normal distribution as shown in Figure 5.6 in which σ=100ps and
x-axis shows the value that Trojan infected TRNG counts each time which makes the
prediction hard for the attacker. Note that without loss of generality, we assumed σ
equals to RO period for simplification.
Figure 5.6: Jitter effect on the Trojan infected TRNG counter values
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Transition matrix of the Trojan infected TRNG for seven lower output bits is shown
by Equation 5.2 where pij is the transition probability that a TRNG output value
which is currently i will move to value j at the next step. For example, p01 = 0.341 is
the probability of TRNG output transition from 0000000 to 0000001. If the current
output value of the TRNG is 0000000, in order to have the value 0000001 as the next
output, the TRNG must increment its current value by 129 in the next clock cycle,
which happens with probability of 0.341 based on Figure 5.6. As another example,
consider p10 = 0.021 which is the probability of TRNG output transition from 0000001,
to 0000000. If the current output value of the TRNG is 0000001, in order to have
value 0000000 as the next value of the TRNG, the TRNG must increment its count
by 127, which happens with probability 0.021 as shown in Figure 5.6.
P =

0000000 0000001 . . . 1111110 1111111
0000000 0.136 0.341 . . . 0.001 0.021
0000001 0.021 0.136 . . . 0.000 0.001
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1111111 0.341 0.341 . . . 0.021 0.136

128∗128
(5.2)
The powers of the transition matrix of the Trojan infected TRNG give the attacker
interesting information about the process as it evolves. She shall be particularly
interested in the state of the chain after a large number of steps. For example, consider
a scenario in which the TRNG output is used to produce a 15-bit secret key for a
crypto system. Guessing this 15-bit secret key with certainty through brute force
requires trying 215 possible values for the key. An attacker that knows the properties
of the output pattern of the Trojan infected TRNG, which are represented by the
transition matrix and power matrices of the Trojan infected TRNG, can have an
enhanced ability to predict output sequences.
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The attacker, for guessing the 15-bit key generated by the Trojan infected TRNG,
needs to predict 5 consecutive times the TRNG output (COUNT [6 : 4]). The power
matrix P 4 gives the attacker the transition probabilities 5 steps from the current state
of the TRNG output. However, the internal states between current state (P 1 = P ) and
the fifth state (P 4) of the TRNG output are also important for the attacker. Assume
the attacker wants to find the probability with which TRNG generates sequence
000, 000, 000, 000, 000. P 4 gives the probabilities with which TRNG generates output
value = 000 at step 5 when its output value is 000 at step 1, independent of the
output values in steps 2, 3, and 4. The attacker wants to know the probability that
the intermediate output values (steps 2, 3, and 4) are 000 too. To solve this problem,
we modify the transition matrix P before computing P 4 in order to avoid counting
sequences that contain unwanted intermediate states. Equation 5.3 shows the modified
P for sequence 000, 000, 000, 000, 000 in which we set to zero the probabilities of all
unwanted transitions that are incompatible with the desired sequence. For example,
transition from state 0000001 to state 1111111 corresponds to COUNT [6 : 4] = 000
being followed by COUNT [6 : 4] = 111 which is incompatible with the target sequence,
so we set the transition probability to zero so that it won’t be counted. As can be
seen in this figure, only a block of size 16 × 16 remains as non-zero; this 16 × 16
block denotes the probabilities of all possible transitions from states 000xxxx to states
000xxxx where x ∈ {0, 1}. After obtaining the modified transition matrix P ′, we
compute P ′
4
which includes the probabilities of four transitions from the current state.
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P ′ =
0000000 0000001 . . . 0001111 0010000 . . . 1111111

0000000 0.136 0.341 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
0000001 0.021 0.136 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
...
...
...
. . .
... 0.000
. . . 0.000
0001111 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.136 0.000 . . . 0.000
0010000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1111111 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000 0.000 . . . 0.000
128∗128
(5.3)
Consider u as the probability vector which represents the initial state of a Markov
chain, then the ith component of u represents the probability that the chain starts in
state si. For our Trojan infected TRNG we assume all initial states are equally likely
to occur. The following vector represents the initial state of our manipulated TRNG
in which the probability that the chain starts in any state is
1
128
.
u = [
1
128
1
128
1
128
...
1
128
1
128
]1×128 (5.4)
The probability that the chain is in state si after n steps is the ith entry in the
following vector:
u(n) = uP n (5.5)
To obtain the probability of the sequence 000, 000, 000, 000, 000 we set n = 4 in
the Equation 5.5 and then add all non-zero probabilities as shown in Equations 5.6
and 5.7. The obtained value is almost equal to the measured value in our experiment.
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u(4) = uP ′4 = [
1
128
1
128
1
128
...
1
128
1
128
]P ′4 (5.6)
P (000, 000, 000, 000, 000) =
i=128∑
i=0
uP ′4[i] = 0.0764 (5.7)
An attacker can use this method to obtain the most likely patterns for an n-bit key.
Table 5.1 lists the eight most likely patterns of a 15-bit key and their probabilities.
The attacker can guess the 15-bit key with the probability of 0.61 by trying these
eight patterns.
Table 5.1: Most likely 15-bit patterns
15-bit Pattern Probability
000000000000000 0.0764
001001001001001 0.0764
010010010010010 0.0764
011011011011011 0.0764
100100100100100 0.0764
101101101101101 0.0764
110110110110110 0.0764
111111111111111 0.0764
5.5 Practical Results
45nm Nangate Open Cell Library is used for our implementation of the Trojan
free and Trojan infected TRNGs.
5.5.1 Randomness and Performance of the TRNG
The randomness of the Trojan free TRNG and the Trojan infected TRNG are
evaluated by the NIST statistical test suite [5]. The Trojan free TRNG is robust
and passes all NIST tests across all temperatures (25◦C, 60◦C, 120◦C) as shown in
Table 5.2. The NIST test suite results of the Trojan infected TRNG are also shown in
Table 5.2 for different temperatures (25◦C, 60◦C, 120◦C). The Trojan infected TRNG
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passes the tests at the normal environmental temperatures (25◦C, 60◦C), but at the
trigger temperature of 120◦C does not pass the tests.
Table 5.2: NIST test suite results for Trojan free and Trojan infected TRNG
NIST
Trojan free design Trojan infected design
25◦C 60◦C 120◦C 25◦C 60◦C 120◦C
Frequency pass pass pass pass pass pass
Block frequency pass pass pass pass pass fail
Cumulative sums (1) pass pass pass pass pass fail
Cumulative sums (2) pass pass pass pass pass pass
Longest runs pass pass pass pass pass pass
FFT pass pass pass pass pass fail
Approximate entropy pass pass pass pass pass fail
The measured distribution of number of cycles to collapse of the Trojan infected
3-edge RO at different environmental temperatures are shown in Figure 5.7 which
follows inverse Gaussian distribution. Increasing the temperature causes the mean
and variance of the number of cycles to collapse to decrease. At 120◦C the mean value
becomes 0 with negligible variance, meaning that the Trojan infected TRNG collapses
within the first few cycles and therefore does not provide enough entropy.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the Trojan free TRNG bitstream and also the Trojan infected
TRNG bitstream, raster scanning top-to-bottom then left-to-right. The outputs of
the Trojan-free TRNG do not have any apparent pattern (Figure 5.8(a)), while the
outputs of the Trojan infected TRNG at the trigger temperature are clearly periodic
and non-random (Figure 5.8(b)). As another view of the same data, the output values
of the Trojan-free TRNG for 600 samples (1800 bits) are shown in Figure 5.9(a), and
the output values of the Trojan infected TRNG are shown in Figure 5.9(b). The
Trojan infected TRNG produces output patterns that are largely periodic but have
some noise.
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of 3-edge RO cycles to collapse at different environmental
temperatures
(a) Trojan free TRNG
(b) Trojan infected TRNG
Figure 5.8: Output patterns of (a) the Trojan free TRNG, and (b) the Trojan infected
TRNG, raster scanning left-to-right then top-to-bottom.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.9: Output values of (a) Trojan free TRNG and (b) Trojan infected TRNG at
120◦C.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Hardware Trojans have gained increasing attention in academia, industry and
by government agencies. Designing reliable Trojan countermeasures requires an
understanding of how hardware Trojans can be built in practice. This area, which
has received relatively scant treatment in the literature, is the topic of this thesis.
In particular, the thesis examines how particularly stealthy parametric Trojans can
be introduced to VLSI circuits. Parametric Trojans are those which do not require
any additional logic, but instead are based on subtle manipulations of designs at the
sub-transistor level. The thesis has shown how parametric Trojans can infect three
specific designs, for different purposes. All three Trojans proposed in the thesis would
be very hard to detect, and may even be able to evade detection by a certification lab.
The three specific Trojan examples in thesis are intended to be case studies, and the
methodologies developed for inserting the Trojans can have broad application in other
circuits.
Firstly, this thesis introduced a new type of parametric hardware Trojans based on
rarely-sensitized path delay faults. While hardware Trojans using parametric changes
(i.e. that only modify the performance/parameters of gates) have been proposed
before, the previously proposed parametric hardware Trojans cannot be triggered
deterministically. They are instead either triggered after time by aging [79], triggered
randomly under reduced voltage [50] or are always on and can leak keys using a
power side-channel [7]. In contrast, the proposed parametric hardware Trojan in this
paper can be triggered by applying specific input sequences to the circuit. Hence,
this work introduces the first trigger-based parametric hardware Trojan. To achieve
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this, a SAT-based algorithm is presented which efficiently searches a combinational
circuit for paths that are extremely rarely sensitized. A genetic algorithm is then
used to distribute delays over all the gates on the path so that a path delay fault
occurs when trigger inputs are applied, while for other inputs the timing criteria are
met. In this way, a faulty response is computed only for a very small subset of input
combinations. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed technique, a 32-bit
multiplier is modified so that, for some multiplications, faulty responses are computed.
These faults can be so rare that they do not interfere with normal operations but can
still be used by the Trojan designer for a bug attack against public key algorithms. As
a motivating example, we showed how this can be achieved for ECDH implementations.
Please note that while we used a multiplier as our case study, the general idea of
path delay Trojans and the tool-flow and algorithms presented in this work are not
restricted to multipliers. Hence, this work shows that by making only extremely
stealthy parametric changes to a design, a malicious factory could insert backdoors to
leak out secret keys.
In this thesis, we also show how to insert a parametric hardware Trojan with very
low overhead into SCA-resistant designs. The presented Trojan is capable of being
integrated into both ASIC and FPGA platforms. Since it does not add any logic
into the design, its chance of being detected is expected to be very low. Compared
to the original design, its only footprint is around 10% decrease in the maximum
clock frequency. We have shown that by increasing the clock frequency, the malicious
threshold implementation design starts leaking exploitable information through side
channels. Hence, the Trojan adversary can trigger the Trojan and make use of the
exploitable leakage, while the design can pass SCA evaluations when the Trojan is not
triggered. More precisely, suppose that the maximum clock frequency of the malicious
device is 196 MHz. Hence, in an evaluation lab its SCA leakage will not be examined at
200 MHz because the device does not operate correctly. However, the Trojan adversary
runs the device at 216 MHz and the SCA leakage becomes exploitable. To the best of
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our knowledge, compared to the previous works in the areas of side-channel hardware
Trojans, our construction is the only one which is applied on a provably-secure SCA
countermeasure, and is parametric with very low overhead.
Finally, this dissertation also shows how a parametric hardware Trojan with very
low overhead can be inserted into RO-based TRNG designs. The underlying concept
is based on removing source of entropy of the TRNG when Trojan is triggered in
high temperature, while the malicious TRNG works correctly and generate random
outputs in normal conditions. To inject the Trojan, we lengthen the certain path
of combinatorial logic in the RO such that increasing the temperature can diminish
the entropy of the of the circuit upon which the TRNG is based. We elaborate a
stochastic model based on Markov Chain for the attacker’s knowledge to predict the
output of the Trojan infected TRNG. This parametric Trojan allows us to significantly
lower the security level even of highly protected crypto-core implementations that are
connected to the TRNG.
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